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Summary
Clinical psychologist’s training emphasises research as a key component of their 
professional skills. Recent surveys have shown, however, that the majority of clinical 
psychologists produce no research. Looking only at articles published as a definition 
of research may have led previous surveys to underestimate the level of research 
activity of clinical psychologists. Using a broader definition of research activity, “The 
RIPS: Research Involvement of Psychologists Scale” was constructed and 
distributed to a sample of qualified clinical psychologists working in the NHS. The 
survey revealed that previous surveys of this kind had underestimated the research 
activity of clinical psychologists, and that the majority of respondents indicated that 
they were dissatisfied with their lack of research involvement, pressure to spend time 
in clinical contact contributing significantly to this. Clinical psychologists must alter 
their working priorities if they are to fulfil the research potential promised by their 
lengthy and intensive research training.
Introduction
The teaching of clinical psychology in Britain, as well as producing skilled therapists 
also emphasises research methodology as a key feature of clinical training. Arising 
principally from the work of Eysenck and The Institute of Psychiatry's efforts to 
"develop a hypothetico-deductive structure, of unquestionably scientific appearance 
for..abnormal behaviour," clinical psychologists have adopted the model of "Scientist- 
Practitionef.1
Several recent surveys have discovered, however, that the majority of clinical 
psychologists publish no research, the published work being produced by a highly 
industrious few .2,3,4 5
Milne, Britton & Wilkinson, (1990)6 replicated the finding that the majority of clinical 
psychologists produce zero research, but found that looking only at number of articles 
published creates an artificially low estimate of the research involvement of most 
clinical psychologists. Milne et al.'s survey operationalised research involvement as; 
publishing research, using single-case experimental designs, presenting an empirical 
paper at a local professional event, discussing research informally with colleagues and 
reviewing an article for a journal, for example. Using this broad definition, Milne et. al. 
conclude that, “as a group, our sample of U.K. Clinical Psychologists are supportive of 
and adhere to the scientist - practitioner model of professional practice”.
The current survey seeks to determine the level of research involvement of clinical 
psychologists within Greater Glasgow Community and Mental Health Services NHS 
Trust and to uncover the factors that are associated with research production.
Methods
A questionnaire was devised to survey the participants, who were 54 qualified clinical 
psychologists employed either by the above mentioned trust, the University of Glasgow 
Department of Psychological Medicine or were jointly funded by these two bodies. 
These two groups shall be referred to as clinical staff and academic staff respectively. 
39 participants responded, representing a response rate of 72 % , which compares 
favourably with other surveys of this nature.
Respondents
47.4% of respondents were B grade, 52.6% A grade, 78.9% of the sample were 
clinical staff with 21.1% academic staff. 55.3% of the sample described their favoured
7conceptual orientation as cognitive-behavioural, with 36.8% favouring an eclectic 
approach. 1 respondent ( 2.6% ) endorsed behavioural, 1 psychodynamic and 1 
feminist as their favoured conceptual orientation. 23.1% of respondents had obtained a 
PhD, 89% of these were academic staff, 11% clinical. The minimum number of years 
since qualification as a clinical psychologist was 1, maximum 22, with a mean of 10 
and a standard deviation of 6.7.
There are approximately 300 trained clinical psychologists in Scotland, it is estimated 
that approximately 16 - 20 of these are in academic posts. This represents a proportion 
of approximately 6.6% , indicating that the current sample is biased towards academic 
staff. As it is reasonable to assume that academic staff will differ in their research 
activities from clinical staff, these two groups have been reported separately 
throughout.
Despite this it was hypothesised that the current sample would be similar to the sample 
reported by Milne et al. (1990) such that a broad operationalisation of research 
involvement would yield more information than published articles alone.
The questionnaire was organised in three sections;
1. level of research activity
2. attitudes towards research
3. demographic information concerning various aspects of the respondents job and 
career including grade, source of post funding, number of years qualified and type 
of qualification(s) held.
Questionnaires were anonymous and confidentiality was assured. A copy of the “RIPS 
: Research Involvement of Psychologists Scale” is enclosed (Appendix 1).
8Analysis
In examining research involvement, different activities were categorised as research 
involvement, others as research production and other items contributed to a research 
consumption score. Individuals responses to these items ( currently involved, involved 
since qualifying and never involved since qualifying) were summed to generate ordinal 
scores for each of the above factors. Attitude questions were also broken down to 
reflect two factors; favourable attitudes towards research involvement and perceived 
external pressure discouraging research involvement. Respondents answers on a 
Likert scale were summed to give ordinal scores on each of these two factors. 
Demographic information was categorised either directly (e.g. number of years 
qualified) or coded numerically (e.g. A grade =1 B Grade = 2 ).
Results
Levels of Research Activity
Table 1 shows the level of endorsement of the research items on the RIPS, collapsed 
into the three factors described above; production, involvement and consumption. The 
table shows levels of activity for academic and clinical staff and for the whole sample.
(Insert Table 1 here)
Table 1 shows that there is considerable research activity being reported by the sample 
as a whole. Current involvement in research consumption activities (e.g. reading 
articles, discussing research findings with colleagues, attending local or national 
conferences) is reported by an average of 52.8% of the sample. A further 41.5% have 
done these activities since qualifying and only 5.6% have never been involved in 
research consumption activities, indicating that the scientist-practitioner model has 
been broadly adopted by almost 95 % of the psychologists surveyed.
9Looking separately at clinical versus academic staff, 90% of academic compared to just 
43.3% of clinical staff are currently involved in research consumption. An average of 
50% of clinical staff indicated that they had only been involved in research consumption 
activities since qualifying, but were not currently involved in these activities. None of 
the academic staff were in this category.
Research Involvement Activities (e.g. designing and carrying out studies, surveys, 
audit, clinical outcome trials, seeing patients for research studies) were currently being 
pursued by 35.3 % of the total sample. An equally large figure (38 %) had never done 
these types of activities since qualifying. Again, looking at the two groups separately, 
70.2 % of academic compared to only 25.4% of clinical staff were currently involved in 
research. 26.3% of clinical staff had been involved in research since qualifying but 
almost half of the clinical staff (48%) had never been involved in the activities 
categorised as research involvement since qualifying.
Current involvement in Research Production Activities (e.g. presenting at a conference, 
writing reviews, submitting work for publication) were reported by an average of 35.8 % 
of the total sample. 84.4% of academic staff were currently involved in producing 
research, compared to 23.8% of the clinical staff. 30% of the clinical staff had been 
involved in research production since qualifying, though almost half (46.2%) had never 
produced research since qualifying as a clinical psychologist.
Close examination of Table 1 reveals that the average endorsement of research 
production activities is similar to the average endorsement of research involvement 
activities, both for academic and clinical staff. This implies that those that are involved 
in research are also managing to disseminate the results of their research by producing 
research for journals, local and national meetings and conferences. This is in contrast
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to the conclusions reached by other surveys of this nature, and likely reflects the 
broader definition of research production adopted by the current survey.
Looking more closely at the items that contribute towards a persons’ research 
production score, it is encouraging to see that, as mentioned above, a similar figure 
who report involvement in research are submitting it to journals for publication. 
Although approximately 50 % of clinical staff have never submitted work for publication, 
the other 50 % are either currently submitting or have done since qualifying. This is 
surprising compared to previous surveys’ conclusions. 25% of clinical staff currently 
submitting work for publication would appear to qualify as more than the “Highly 
industrious few,” reported by previous surveys.2 3,4,5
Psychologists’ Attitudes Towards Research
Table 2 indicates that although academic staff tend to agree more strongly that they 
regularly think about areas of psychological theory or practice that they would like to 
research, it remains encouraging that 90% of clinical staff regularly think about these 
areas also. Only 20 % of clinical staff, compared to 62.5 % of academic staff, feel that 
they have enough time to put their research ideas into practice. Consistent with this is 
the finding that 80 % of clinical staff feel that pressure to spend time in clinical contact 
is preventing them from carrying out research. This is only rated as a problem for 25% 
of academic staff.
(Insert Table 2 Here)
Almost the entire sample agreed that research findings are of relevance to clinical 
practice, with only 3.3% of clinical staff disagreeing. Consistent with this, 100 % of 
academic staff and 60 % of clinical staff indicated strongly that research was the 
domain of clinical psychologists. A further 36.7% of clinical staff endorsed this item 
positively, though less strongly, making a total of 100% of academic staff and 96.7% of
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clinical staff indicating that research is thought to be a valid pursuit for clinical 
psychologists.
86.7% of clinical staff and 87.5% of academic staff indicated that they were interested 
in doing research. Unusually, 12.5% of academic staff indicated strongly that they were 
not interested in doing research. Members of clinical staff were more strongly in 
agreement than academic staff that psychologists should have agreed research time 
and, in fact, 12.5% of academic staff strongly disagreed that they should have research 
time.
Compared to clinical staff, academic staff were more likely to rate their research 
involvement as about right (62.5% vs. 20 %). 56.7% of clinical staff rated their research 
involvement as “Far too little". A further 23.3% of clinical staff felt that there involvement 
in research was slightly too little. Combining these figures the majority of clinical staff 
(80%) feel that their involvement in research is too little. This compares to only 37.5% 
of academic staff.
Interestingly, both academic and clinical staff felt that research was encouraged in their 
post, though academic staff felt it was more strongly encouraged than clinical staff. 
Again 12.5% of academic staff felt that research was strongly discouraged in their post. 
Given that this figure represents one respondent, and that their responses are so at 
odds with the other members of academic staff, it may be parsimonious to assume that 
this person’s responses are a result of misunderstanding the questions rather than a 
reflection of their actual attitude.
Factors Associated with Research
The items on Table 2 were summed to create ordinal scores for each individual on 
both of the underlying factors, favourable attitudes towards research and pressures 
against research. These attitude scores could then be analysed for association with the
12
research involvement, consumption and production factors, along with the 
demographic components of the RIPS. Table 3 shows the matrix of Kendall’s Tau b 
correlation coefficients for the variables of interest with research production, 
consumption, and involvement.
(Insert Table 3 Here)
Although many of the correlations shown in the table are statistically significant, due to 
the constrains of this article, only a selection of them will be discussed in the text.
Table 3 shows a number of interesting associations. Firstly, unsurprisingly, working in a 
split clinical / academic post is significantly associated with higher scores on all three 
measures of research activity. Secondly, and also unsurprisingly, being highly involved 
in research and being a high consumer of research are strongly associated with 
research production, for clinical staff alone and for the whole sample but not for 
academic staff. It becomes apparent from an examination of table 3 that separating 
clinical staff from respondents who work in split clinical / academic posts significantly 
alters the factors that are associated with research activity. Being a B grade 
psychologist, for instance, is significantly associated with all three research factors 
when looking at the sample combined, but is significantly associated only with research 
involvement when looking at clinical staff alone.
Number of hours per week dedicated to research is significantly associated with all 
three research measures for the sample combined, and for clinical staff alone, but is 
not associated with production or consumption of research for the academic staff.
A number of correlations appear to be artefacts of the academic vs. clinical variable. 
For instance: number of hours per week in clinical contact is significantly negatively 
associated with research involvement and consumption for the whole sample, but not
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for clinical staff alone. As the academic staff tend to spend less time in clinical contact 
(mean = 14 hours per week vs. 24 hours per week) combining the sample creates the 
association described.
Given the responses illustrated in table 2, however, it would not be unreasonable to 
suggest that the reduced pressure to spend time in clinical contact is a significant factor 
in the academic psychologists’ greater research production.
Number of years qualified is significantly associated with research activity, with those 
qualified longer reporting more involvement and consumption both for clinical staff and 
the whole sample. This may simply reflect that staff with longer careers have had more 
opportunity to be involved in the activities surveyed.
Interestingly, holding a PhD is significantly associated with all three measures of 
research activity for the sample as a whole, again related to the third variable of 
academic vs. clinical staff, but only for research consumption when looking at the 
clinical staff.
Another surprising finding was that recently qualified psychologists who hold the new 
D. Clin. Psy. qualification are significantly less likely to be involved in research than 
their longer qualified colleagues. This association remains true for clinical staff alone 
and is seen in both the research consumption and involvement domains. Given that 
part of the purpose of increasing training to a three year doctoral degree was to 
promote the research aspect of the clinical psychologist’s role, this survey indicates 
that as yet the professions’ aspirations in this area remain unfulfilled.
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Discussion
These results have a number of implications for the profession. Firstly, the current 
sample’s research activity contrasts favourably with the levels of research production 
(as defined by numbers of articles published) reported by previous surveys, supporting 
Milne et al’s. view that research involvement can not be narrowly confined to publishing 
articles in peer reviewed journals. Taking this broader position on research it appears 
that the psychologists employed within the trust under study have very much adopted 
the scientist practitioner role.
Secondly, there is still a huge discrepancy between the research activity of university 
clinical psychologists and NHS clinical psychologists. As there are several differences 
between these groups (e.g. academic staff feel less pressures against research, they 
are more likely to hold a PhD, tend to be longer qualified, spend less hours per week in 
clinical contact, have more hours per week dedicated to research, and feel that 
research is more strongly encouraged in their post) it is difficult to determine which of 
these are the key factors in explaining the research differences between these groups.
The data also suggest that the majority of NHS psychologists would like to get more 
involved in research, they feel that they have the skills and ideas, but that time 
pressures to see patients simply don’t allow them to become involved in research.
Furthermore, the respondents reporting research involvement tend to be longer 
qualified and are often B grade staff. Looking at clinical staff alone shows that these 
respondents report less time in clinical contact, more time in management duties and 
clinical supervision. An interesting extension of this study would be to investigate 
whether B grades feel less pressure to see patients, whether they are better at 
organising their time to let them become involved in research or whether other factors 
are involved in their greater research involvement.
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It would also be highly informative to follow up this survey when the holders of D. Clin. 
Psy. qualifications have had more time to develop their careers and see whether their 
research potential is fulfilled. Given that recent graduates are probably more likely to be 
familiar with recent literature and research methodology it would seem a waste of a 
valuable resource that they are not getting more involved in research. A further 
interesting extension of this study would be to investigate the reasons behind newly 
qualified staff not being involved in research.
Given that 80% of clinical staff feel that pressure to spend time in clinical contact is a 
barrier to their research involvement and that an equivalent percentage feel that their 
research involvement is not nearly enough, it would seem prudent to investigate ways 
of tackling both of these problems.
Given clinical psychology’s scientific, problem focused approach to patient’s problems, 
it seems unusual that the profession as a whole has been unable to reach a solution to 
the problem of increasing demand on psychologist’s time. Could not psychologists be 
given a proportion of time in which to develop innovative approaches to therapeutic 
contact, whilst evaluating these new approaches for effectiveness? This would be, 
after all, a daring application of the scientist-practitioner model in practice.
16
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Table 1: Average Level of Research Activity
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Table 2: Psychologists’ Attitudes Towards Research
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Table 3: Factors Significantly Associated With Research Activity
Kendall’s Tau B Correlation Coefficients
Factor Research Production Research
Involvement
Research
Consumption
Acc Clin Total Acc Clin Total Acc Clin Total
Academic
Post
.547
** .386**
.524
**
B Grade .554 .266 .373 .000 .376
*
.362
**
.280 .325 .420
**
Grants .161 .258 .547 .148 .263 .386
**
-.275 .256 .498
*★
No. of Hours 
per week 
dedicated to 
Research
.125 .332
*
.545
**
.692
*
.291
*
.446
**
.143 .303
*
.504
**
No. hours 
per week 
in clinical 
contact
-.158 .046 -.240 -.513 -.115 -.35
**
-.418 -.200 -.41
No of hours 
per week in 
management 
duties
.474 .090 .111 .154 .129 .259
*
.299 .152 .296
it
No. of years 
qualified .293 .299 .339* -.154 .36** .335
**
.095 .40
**
.452
**
Favourable
attitudes
towards
research
.251 .229 .132 .577 .231 .255
*
.476 .191 .134
Perceived
pressure
against
research
.000 -.136 -.32
** -.431
-.139 -.229 -.243 -.164 -.34
**
Qualification
PhD. .554 .292 .530
**
.000 .207 .349
*
.280 .354
*
.549
★
MSc. .343
*
.414
**
.43
**
.439
**
.120 .253
D. Clin. Psy. -.233 -.348
*
-.35
*
-.37
**
-.33
*
-.405
Research
Involvement
.251 .59 .597
** 1.00 1.00 1.00 .333
.324
*
.432
**
Research
Consumption
.207 .305
*
.501
**
.333 .324
*
.432
**
1.00 1.00 1.00
*  Correlation significant at 0.05 level *  *  Correlation significant at 0.01 level
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Evidence for Repetitive Thinking as a Factor
In the Maintenance of Depression
Criticisms of Beck’s cognitive theory have led to theoretical 
developments in models of information processing. A new 
framework, The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model 
(ICS), (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993) is outlined. This 
framework has suggested that a repetitive style of information 
processing is an important factor in the maintenance of 
depression (see Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 106). This 
position is discussed with reference to empirical studies and 
theoretical reviews in the current literature. Directions for 
further research are suggested.
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In introducing a recent edited text on the subject of cognitive behaviour therapy, 
Rachman suggested that,
"Cognitive behaviour therapy is...in all likelihood...the most broadly and 
confidently endorsed form of psychological therapy. Cognitive behaviour 
therapy dominates clinical research and practice in many parts of the 
world” (Rachman, 1998, p. 4).
Arising principally from the clinical observations of Beck (see Beck; 1963; 1964; Beck, 
Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979), the cognitive model suggests that depression is 
associated with an identifiable pattern of cognitive changes. Beck (1964) proposes that 
certain individuals “stable mental representations of experience” (schemata), put them 
at greater risk of developing depression than others, as their life experiences have 
supported the development of “maladaptive schemata” (Beck, 1964).
An example of such a schema might be, “Less than perfect performance in all that I do 
is equivalent to total failure.” Critical life events are thought to ‘activate’ such schemata 
- in the above example, life events involving minor failures would be expected to 
activate this schema.
Once activated, schemata are believed to distort perceptual and inferential processes 
and lead to behaviour changes, such that experience remains consistent with the 
active schema. For example, the perception of personal failure might lead a person to 
withdraw from social contact. This may result in reduced probability of encountering 
success experiences, predictions of future successes might be reduced, and 
attributions for any success experiences may be more likely to be attributed to external
24
factors (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). This “domination” of information 
processing is hypothesised to maintain depressed mood (Beck, 1963).
Whilst recognising the highly influential contribution of Beck’s model to the study of 
psychopathology, Teasdale and Barnard (1993), have proposed that it is flawed in 
several ways and propose an alternative framework within which information- 
processing accounts of a wide range of psychopathological phenomena may be 
developed.
The criticisms of Beck’s model (Beck, 1963; 1964; Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery, 
1979) and The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model which attempts to answer 
them are described more thoroughly in a book and several journal articles, (see for 
example Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Teasdale, 1993; Teasdale, Segal & Williams, 
1995; Teasdale, Taylor, Cooper, Hayhurst & Paykel, 1995). A brief outline of this work 
is presented here.
Teasdale and colleagues argue that Beck’s theory is flawed in a number of theoretical 
and pragmatic ways. Firstly, they argue that Beck’s account is,
“A clinical rather than a scientific theory...[its]...purpose is to guide the clinician in 
understanding and treating patients, rather than to provide a detailed exposition 
articulated in precise theoretical terms” (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 7).
Teasdale further contends that the development of Beck’s theory, “Has proceeded 
largely in isolation from basic cognitive science” (Teasdale, 1993, p. 341). It is argued 
that this has resulted in Beck’s theory being, “Relatively imprecise” (Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993, p. 7), and that Beck’s, “use of the term cognition diverges from [its] use 
in cognitive psychology...and has been the basis of a number of misunderstandings” 
(Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 8).
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Beck’s model is further criticised on the basis that clinical and research findings do not 
support Beck’s original formulation of cognitive theory (Beck et. al., 1979). For 
example, evidence suggests that dysfunctional schemata may be a consequence 
rather than a cause of depression (Teasdale, 1988).
Similarly, Simons, Garfield & Murphy (1984) have shown that after pharmacological 
treatment for depression, which makes no explicit attempt to modify cognition but 
instead alleviates depressed mood through biochemical means, most measures of 
negative cognition return to normal levels (Simons, Garfield & Murphy, 1984). This 
suggests that the characteristic depressive cognition observed by Beck (Beck, 1963), 
may at least be a consequence, rather than a cause of depression.
Whilst acknowledging that Beck’s theory has now taken a more parsimonious position 
to accommodate findings such as these, this process of revision is further criticised by 
Teasdale & Barnard: “Presentations of the model have...varied from one statement to 
another and have shifted in their emphasis over time”
(Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 7).
Finally, and perhaps the most clinically relevant criticism levelled by Teasdale & 
Barnard, is at Beck’s conceptual position on the relation between meaning and 
emotion. They argue,
“ Beck’s cognitive model recognises only one level of meaning and for 
that reason has considerable difficulties with the distinction between 
“intellectual “ and “emotional” belief, or, more generally, between “cold” 
and "hot” cognition. So when a depressed person says something like “I 
know I’m not worthless but I don’t believe it emotionally,” the Beck
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approach suggests that this simply reflects quantitative variations in a
single level of meaning:
“The therapist can tell the patient that a person can not believe 
anything ’emotionally’...when the patient says he believes or 
does not believe something emotionally, he is talking about 
degree of belief ’ (Beck et. al., 1979, p. 302, original italics).
Many clinicians have found this analysis unconvincing, regarding 
“emotional” belief as qualitatively distinct from “intellectual” belief, and 
functionally more important”
(Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 10, original italics).
These authors propose an alternative framework within which to investigate cognitive- 
affective interaction, The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems approach (ICS), (Teasdale 
and Barnard, 1993).
The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model
ICS is a conceptual framework within which its authors claim, “in principle, accounts of 
any aspect of information processing can be developed” (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 
49).
Its authors claim that it addresses their criticisms of the cognitive model by
1) Allowing conceptually for two different levels of meaning, with correspondingly 
different relationships to emotion production.
2) they claim that its specification is at a level precise enough both to provide a 
theoretical account of cognitive-affective interaction, and provide a source of 
experimental hypotheses that can be empirically tested.
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3) They further claim that ICS’s development within a basic cognitive science 
perspective prevents the misunderstandings described earlier, that are associated 
with Beck’s theory.
Given such ambitious claims, it is no surprise that the resulting framework proposed is 
detailed and complex. Interested readers are referred to Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, 
and Teasdale, 1997, for a comprehensive account. The essence of the ICS framework 
is briefly presented below, and is portrayed in simplified diagrammatic form (Fig. 1).
(Insert Figure 1. here)
The ICS framework rests on a few relatively simple ideas (see Teasdale, 1997, p. 144). 
Firstly, different aspects of conscious experience are mentally represented in different 
subsystems, each of which is specialised to process only that kind of representational 
code. For example, the visual sub-system processes information representative of very 
basic sensory information, such as the pattern of light and shade falling upon the 
retina, whilst the acoustic sub-system operates on mental representations of sound 
waves detected by the ear.
Recurring regularities in patterns of these basic sensory codes are synthesised by 
dedicated subsystems into higher level codes, representing increasingly elaborate 
levels of conscious experience. There are for example, subsystems dedicated to 
processing representations of objects, of words and of specific concepts and the 
relationships between them (The ‘object’, ‘morphonolexical’ and ‘propositional’ 
subsystems, respectively). The ICS framework also proposes that an ‘implicational’ 
subsystem exists, which processes mental representations that relate to the holistic, 
felt senses that have been abstracted as prototypical of particular experiences. It is 
these implicational representations, at a very abstract level of meaning, that are linked 
to the production of emotion.
28
The second concept in the ICS approach is that each sub-system transforms 
representations in its own code into other codes and directs this as output to the other 
appropriately dedicated sub-system. Each sub-system learns the transformations to 
make based on recurring regularities and co-variations encountered in an individual’s 
experience. Figure 2 helps to illustrate.
(Insert Figure 2. here)
In the upper part of the diagram, basic sensory codes simply represent the patterns of 
light and dark falling upon the retina, reflected from the page. At this level of 
representation, the patterns are simply black and grey marks and lines against a white 
background. In the middle panel, exactly the same areas of light and shade are 
presented, though their arrangement synthesises (on the basis of prior recurring 
regularities of similar stimuli) a stylised picture of a ship in port. In the language of ICS, 
the pattern of basic sensory codes synthesised by the visual sub-system has produced 
an output in the object code which has then been directed to the object sub-system. 
The arriving pattern of code has been synthesised by the object sub-system (on the 
basis of previous co-occurrences of such patterns of visual code) to recognise the 
scene presented.
Looking at the lower panel, a small change in the positioning of the elements results in 
a different propositional meaning being synthesised. The object level of representation 
remains the same, it is still a cartoon of a ship. The re-arrangement of the elements 
have, however constructed the new meaning; of the ship putting to sea. Through these 
increasingly elaborate combinations of codes, from basic sensory codes, through 
object recognition codes to propositional level code, the Interacting Cognitive 
Subsystems’ patterns of activity construct, “The specific meanings in terms of the 
discrete concepts and the relationships between them” (Teasdale, 1997, p. 145).
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Importantly, the viewer will also synthesise an ‘implicational model’ which is a mental 
representation of the total holistic experience. As well as taking representations of 
object codes (the construction of a ship), and the specific propositional meanings (the 
ship is leaving port), the implicational sub-system can use information taken from basic 
sensory elements, (e.g. environment, internal bodily state) to synthesise any particular 
implicational model.
Very different implicational models of the experience of looking at figure 2 will be 
synthesised depending upon whether the viewer has ever worked at sea. To illustrate: 
a retired merchant ship captain will experience different associations (implicational 
models) when looking at the picture compared to a person who does not have such life 
experience.
The third basic idea upon which ICS rests is that each sub-system has its own memory 
record of the inputs it receives and the transformations it performs on them. Partial 
fragments of codes arriving at a sub-system initiate access to the memory record of 
that sub-system, completing the fragment with stored representations in the memory 
code and generating appropriate outputs. It follows that after a particular experience, 
multiple records of the event will exist, distributed across the subsystems involved in 
the process. For instance, after a conversation, memory records will exist of the words 
said, the tone of voice and volume used, the specific propositional meaning of the 
words and the implicational meaning of the, “total conversation experience, such as 
threat, attraction or hidden agendas” (Teasdale, 1997, p. 145).
The implication of this memory process is that partial fragments of mental codes can 
complete a total pattern. For example, implicational models relating to ‘self as 
abandoned’ may previously have been synthesised from propositional codes relating to 
specific losses (e.g., the end of a romantic relationship), in combination with body state
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codes (stooped posture, tearfulness, tiredness), and acoustic codes (callous tone of 
voice used by the partner ending the relationship). Due to each individual sub-system’s 
ability to produce total outputs based on fragments of code, the ‘self as abandoned’ 
implicational model may be synthesised, for example, by another person behaving in 
an off-hand manner, without the other elements of the pattern being present.
Finally, a crucial facet of ICS in relation to understanding cognition in depression is the 
process that Teasdale & Barnard term ‘Interlock’. ‘Depressive Interlock’ occurs when 
the affect-eliciting implicational models which represent global, holistic dimensions of 
the self, produce outputs that result in the synthesis of specific propositional meanings 
related to the implicational model from which they were derived. For instance,
“The implicational model of ‘self as a worthless, useless, culpable 
person’ will generate specific propositions relating to being to blame for 
something bad that has just happened, or to pessimistic expectations 
concerning future personal action, or to instructions to access memory 
records of previous failure-related experiences. These propositional 
representations can be [transformed]... to produce elements of 
implicational code. There is an inherent possibility that the pattern of 
implicational code...will recreate a schematic model similar to that from 
which the propositional representations were derived in the first place. In 
this case the "central engine” of cognition, the implicational -  
propositional loop, can become “locked” onto processing information of a 
particular theme...in this way a given mood state, will be maintained in 
the absence of further affect-eliciting environmental input”
(Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 106).
The position presented by Teasdale & Barnard is that a key factor in the maintenance 
of depression is that information processing in depression becomes “stuck.” The
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depressed person’s mind cycles between negative implicational models related to 
depressed affect and specific thoughts, predictions and expectancies related to being 
unhappy, then back again to re-create similar implicational models. Evidence relevant 
to this position is drawn from a variety of sources and summarised below though a 
detailed description of each of these studies is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Evidence for Repetitive information Processing in Depression
There are several converging strands of evidence that indicate that repetitious thinking 
may be linked to the maintenance of depression. These can be summarised as:
1) Evidence from correlational studies of peoples’ responses to naturally occurring 
depressed moods (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; 1990; 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow and Frederikson, 1993);
2) Experimental studies of people with clinically significant depressed mood (Fennel, 
Teasdale, Jones and Damle, 1987).
3) Experimental studies of naturally occurring dysphoric moods (Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow, 1993).
4) Experimental studies of artificially induced dysphoric moods in otherwise healthy 
people (Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990).
5) Prospective longitudinal studies examining the impact of repetitious thinking on 
individual’s risk of experiencing depression (Just and Alloy, 1997; Nolen- 
Hoeksema, Larson and Grayson, 1999).
These studies have, however, been limited in a number of ways. Firstly, they have for 
the most part used non-clinically depressed samples, rendering generalisation to 
clinical samples more difficult (though see for example Fennel, Teasdale, Jones and 
Damle, 1987). Secondly they have often measured repetitive information processing 
using self-report questionnaire. This has led to them studying individuals reported
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responses to depressed mood. No attempt has been made in any of the papers above 
to verify whether people accurately report upon their responses to depressed mood. 
Thirdly, the studies to date have tended to conceptualise rumination as a relatively 
conscious, controlled process in which people choose to engage. The ICS account 
suggests that ‘depressive interlock’ is far less controllable than the above studies would 
suggest. Theoretical and empirical studies that support this position are reviewed 
below.
The Self-Perpetuating Nature of Depression
Several researchers describe findings that suggest that repetitive information 
processing in depressed mood has an uncontrollable quality. Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg (1987), for example, present a ‘self-regulatory model of depression’, in 
which depression is triggered, “By the loss of an important source of self-worth when 
an individual becomes stuck in a self-regulatory cycle in which no response to reduce 
the discrepancy between actual and desired states are available. Consequently the 
individual falls into a pattern of virtually constant self-focus, resulting in intensified 
negative affect” (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987, p. 122).
Pyszczynski & Greenberg (1987), argue that the loss of important sources of self­
esteem instigates a process of self-focus, in an effort to self-regulate. They describe 
the process by which (under normal circumstances) individuals engage in various 
methods to reduce the discrepancy between actual and desired states, devaluing the 
lost object or, for instance, seeking a replacement object. If the lost object is of such 
central importance to their self-esteem that it can not be devalued and no other objects 
are available of remotely equivalent value, the self-regulatory loop can not be exited. 
This results in a high frequency of thoughts about the lost object and the actual / ideal 
self-discrepancy its loss engenders.
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It appears, therefore that the loss of important sources of self-worth in actual and 
symbolic form lead (understandably) to negative affect. Negative affect in turn activates 
a self-regulatory routine designed to reduce the discrepancy between actual and 
desired outcomes. When this discrepancy can not be reduced, the person remains 
“stuck”, continuing to repetitively focus upon the lost object and the self-ideal 
discrepancy represented by its loss.
Further experimental work by Carr, Teasdale and Broadbent (1991), supports the 
hypothesis that negative affect increases negative self-focus. Using a musical mood 
induction procedure, these authors induced elated or dysphoric moods in non-clinically 
depressed participants (Beck Depression Inventory <14). Visual analogue scales were 
used to check the efficacy of the mood manipulation. These indicated that the groups 
differed significantly in the expected direction. Whilst in elated or dysphoric mood, 
participants were administered a sentence completion task designed to assess self or 
external focus. Participants’ performance on this task was compared with their pre­
mood induction performance on the same task.
Results indicated that dysphoric mood significantly increases negative self-focus, but 
does not decrease positive or neutral external focus, in comparison to elated mood. 
These results may have adaptive significance, as follows: negative moods may initiate 
a “self-focus routine, ” in which saddening events are replayed and ‘emotional 
processing’ (Rachman, 1980) may occur. To presume that an affect-regulation process 
exists in humans makes intuitive sense. Negative affect instigates an ‘actual self-ideal 
self discrepancy’. This begins a process of self-attention in an effort to search for 
behaviours that will return the organism to the ideal self state, thereby reducing 
negative affect. Such discrepancy reducing behaviours may be overt (such as 
distracting activity, sports, socialising) or may be covert (such as thinking about other 
achievements, daydreaming, distracting pleasurable fantasy). If, as suggested by 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg (1987), the extent of the loss is very great and no
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discrepancy reduction behaviours are available, the self-regulatory loop will persist. 
Unfortunately, this self-focus will further lower mood, creating a vicious circle.
Drawing upon the Revised Learned Helplessness work of Abramson, Seligman & 
Teasdale (1978), Pyszczynski & Greenberg (1987) further suggest that when an 
individual becomes stuck in this self-regulatory loop it affects their attributions for 
events such that more internal attributions are made for negative events. These 
authors contend that these negative self-attributions lead to the formation of a negative 
identity that helps the person to avoid future expectancy of happiness. By avoiding 
such happiness the individual will never again have to face such pain as they did as a 
result of the original loss. The formation of such attributions may be the only available 
means of exiting the self-regulatory cycle, which is presumed to be a cognitively costly 
process and in depression is likely to be experienced as unpleasant. The relief from 
unpleasant negative self-focus provided by the formation of such an identity is likely to 
be negatively reinforcing, which would be expected to lead to a greater probability that 
internal attributions are made for future negative events, thereby maintaining that 
identity. This would be expected to maintain low mood, lack of motivation and negative 
expectancies for future events, adding to the depressed individuals practical and social 
problems, the burden of which feedback to confirm the negative identity (Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987).
Furthermore, as demonstrated by Lyubomirsky, Caldwell and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998), 
and Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995), self-focussed dysphoric rumination 
facilitates spontaneous retrieval of negatively toned autobiographical memories and 
reduces the quality of solutions produced to a social problem-solving task. This 
supports the suggestion that the self-regulatory mechanism proposed by Pyszczynski 
& Greenberg (1987) may be detrimental to the maintenance of effective emotional 
homeostasis in persons who experience many life events or have few personal 
resources with which to deal with negative moods.
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Champion & Power (1996), also suggest that the loss of important sources of self- 
worth is a key factor in the development of depression and that the repetitive focus on 
the self-ideal discrepancy serves to maintain depressed mood. Their analysis focuses 
upon social roles in which individuals are ‘highly invested’. By this they mean that if a 
particular role is an important source of personal identity and self-esteem for a person, 
it’s loss will have correspondingly greater psychological impact than if the role is 
unvalued or if the person has alternate identity-giving roles. These authors describe a 
pattern of over-investment in too few roles as conferring vulnerability to depression, if 
those roles are lost. This is similar to Pyszczynski & Greenberg (1987), in that the over­
investment in one social role would lead a person to have few discrepancy reduction 
strategies (e.g. other roles to focus on) if that role were to be lost to them.
Some Clinical Implications of New Theory
Another suggestion has come from Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993). These 
authors found that dysphoric undergraduates who were offered the opportunity to 
engage in ruminative or distracting responses chose to engage in ruminative 
responses, even when they had indicated by questionnaire that the distracting activities 
would be likely to be enjoyable and that their sense of efficacy to engage in these 
activities was no different to the non-dysphoric participants’. Dysphoric participants 
indicated that they believed the ruminative activities would lead to greater insight, and 
that this insight was a valuable goal. For this reason, participants pursued the 
ruminative strategies, even though they knew that rumination made them feel worse.
Work in other areas of psychopathology, namely generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), 
has used the concept of meta-cognition, or beliefs about beliefs, to devise new 
treatments which tackle worry, a central feature of GAD (Wells, 1995). Lyubomirsky 
and Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1993) finding that people do not wish to distract themselves
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from their low moods because they think that the insight this provides will be of long­
term benefit is a meta-belief that could maintain low moods for some people. Given the 
success that the meta-cognitive analysis has had on treatment of GAD, the study of 
beliefs about beliefs specific to depression may in time bear similar fruit.
Research by McIntosh, Harlow and Martin (1995) has investigated individuals’ 
tendency to link lower order goals with higher order goals. These authors hypothesised 
that individuals who had a tendency to link the attainment or blocking of lower order 
goals (e.g. being one’s ideal weight) to higher order goals (e.g. being a worthwhile 
human being) would experience greater impact of daily hassles upon their moods.
Consistent with this hypothesis, they found that participants’ dispositions to make links 
between lower order goals and higher order goals was associated with participants 
experiencing more rumination, greater levels of depression and more physical 
symptoms of depression, particularly in those who had reported a high number of daily 
hassles. Goal linking may be a consequence, cause or phenomenon associated with 
rumination and may therefore be another form of meta-cognition which future 
researchers may be able to exploit in the development of more efficacious treatments 
for depression.
Kool, Smeets, Van Knippenberg and Dijksterhuis (1999) provide further theoretical 
suggestions that may be translated into therapeutic procedure. In a series of three 
experiments, these authors investigated undergraduate’s responses to failure on a 
mock IQ test. Their findings were that failure induced ruminative thinking about the self­
ideal discrepancy and lowered participants’ mood, entirely consistent with suggestions 
from the research reviewed above.
They further found that procedures similar to those used in cognitive therapy (reframing 
the meaning of the event by telling participants that the tests did not really measure
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intelligence) reduced participants’ rumination. Furthermore, allowing participants to re­
affirm a valued aspect of their self-identity led to equivalent reductions in ruminative 
thinking, compared to a control condition in which participants were given the 
opportunity to re-affirm an aspect of their self-identity which they did not particularly 
value.
Interestingly, the ability of self-affirmation to reduce ruminative thinking was also 
demonstrated when the self-affirmation occurred before the failure experience. This 
finding may have implications for developing relapse prevention techniques for patients 
recovering from depression. Pyszczynski & Greenberg (1987) suggest that individuals 
fail to disengage from the self-regulatory loop because they lack alternate sources of 
self-esteem. Therapeutic efforts that develop other sources of self-esteem, either 
through skill acquisition, behaviour change or raising awareness of other aspects of 
individual’s lives from which esteem could be drawn will be likely to be more effective at 
preventing relapse. Applying Kool et al.’s (1999) findings to this suggests that regular 
re-affirmation of a wide diversity of sources of self-esteem would be likely to prevent 
the instigation of ruminative thinking and its reciprocal relationship with mood, retrieval 
of dysphoric memories and disruption of social problem solving. Such affirmation would 
be relatively easy to incorporate into existing therapeutic programs and would be likely 
to be experienced as both rational and pleasurable by recovering depressed persons.
Self-affirmation can only work, however, if the person has positively valued aspects of 
the self to affirm. Clinical observation suggests that depressed persons devalue 
formerly valued aspects of the self. As described above, Pyszczynski & Greenberg 
(1987) have suggested that a depressive attributional style develops in which 
expectancy for future happiness is avoided in order to protect the individual from future 
pain. Whilst the depressive self-focussing style may protect from pain, it’s long term 
consequences are costly both to individuals and society.
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In dealing effectively with distressing life events, Hunt (1999) has suggested that “The 
only way out is through.” Using undergraduates and again, exposing them to false 
failure on an IQ test, she examined the effect of three post-failure processing 
conditions on subjects self-reported moods tracked over a period of 24 hours. 
Dysphoria was measured using a revised version of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check 
List (MAACL, Zuckerman et al., 1983).
After receiving failure feedback, participants were asked to write one of three essays. 
Participants in the emotional processing condition were asked to write about their test 
performance, their feelings in relation to it and the implications of the test for the future. 
Participants in the disputation condition (designed to be an analogue of cognitive 
therapy) were instructed to write about their perception of the test, to marshal evidence 
that they were brighter than the test suggested and to question whether the test result 
had any relevance for the future. In a distracting condition, participants were instructed 
to write about their favourite TV show in depth, including why they liked it and to 
describe an episode that typified the show. Participants repeated the essays at each 
measurement interval, those in the distracting condition wrote three different essays 
targeted toward pleasure, mastery and simple re-focussing of attention.
As might be expected, all participants reported increased dysphoria following failure on 
an IQ test. Those in the emotional processing condition experienced greater dysphoria 
at time one (immediately after the essay writing) than participants in the other two 
conditions, who experienced similar levels of dysphoria. At time 2 (that evening) and 
time 3 (the following afternoon) Participants in the emotional processing condition felt 
significantly better than those in the other two conditions, who still did not differ 
significantly.
In the second part of Hunt’s study, blind raters coded and analysed each essay for 
evidence of emotional arousal and evidence of cognitive restructuring (including goal
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shifting, citing counter-evidence, and reframing the meaning of the test failure). 
Regression analysis revealed that in each condition, the more dysphoric a person had 
been at time one, the better they felt at time two. A path-analytic model allowed Hunt to 
demonstrate that emotional arousal was the significant variable predicting dysphoria at 
time two, whilst essay condition was not. Hunt argues, “It is only the initial emotional 
processing, while the event is still fresh and the emotions are still strong, that has an 
effect on mood” (Hunt, 1999, p. 374).
Examination of the data for cognitive restructuring indicated some surprising results. 
Firstly, disputers whose essays immediately after failure showed a high level of 
cognitive restructuring had greater dysphoria the following day. When this comparison 
was made with the emotional processing condition, the opposite result was found: that 
subjects who produced a high level of cognitive restructuring and a high level of 
emotional tone in essay one, had better mood the following day. Hunt (1999) 
concludes;
“There was a marginally significant interaction between simultaneous 
emotional arousal and cognitive restructuring such that restructuring was 
somewhat helpful at low levels of arousal, but had little effect at high 
levels of arousal...This study addressed the question of whether 
emotional processing is a useful coping strategy in response to dysphoric 
mood following a depressing life event. The main experimental results 
provided strong evidence that this is the case. Emotional processing 
improved people’s mood more than either pleasure and mastery oriented 
distraction or unemotional cognitive restructuring and problem solving”
(Hunt, 1999, p. 378).
Though Hunt’s (1999) data has been gathered on non-clinical samples, and has 
investigated the immediate reactions to distressing events rather than individuals’ long­
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term reactions to chronic depression, it does suggest that emotional processing may be 
an important conceptual model in research efforts aimed at developing clinical 
techniques to reduce the depressive self-focussing style, negative attributions and lack 
of positive expectancies that Teasdale neatly summarises as “Depressive Interlock” 
(Teasdale and Barnard, 1993).
Conclusions
There appears to be evidence that repetitive information processing plays a strong role 
in the maintenance of negative moods. (NolenHoeksema,1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Larson & Grayson, 1999; Just & Alloy, 1997). There is also some evidence that 
distraction can lift depressed mood, at least in the short-term (Fennel, Teasdale, Jones 
& Damle, 1987; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993).
The distractions described in these studies are however, attention demanding and 
require effortful persistence. It is probably not too presumptuous to state that the 
majority of depressed people are unable to distract themselves from their concerns and 
moods, it is the uncontrollability with which information processing becomes dominated 
by negative concerns that appears to be a characteristic feature of depression.
This may relate to the dysfunction of biologically prepared self-regulatory mechanisms, 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). This dysfunction may stem from several sources; 
individuals may lack alternate sources of self-worth with which to replace the lost 
source of self-esteem, they may devalue other sources of self-worth as being unable to 
replace the lost object or they may even believe that the repetitive self-focus 
engendered by such situations leads to insight, which is to be valued.
ICS and Repetitive Information Processing
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There are likely to be neurological and biochemical mechanisms that underpin the 
emotional regulation system hypothesised by Pyszczynski & Greenberg (1987). 
Likewise, there may be neuropsychological correlates of repetitious information 
processing (see for example Mega and Cummings, 1994; Paradiso, Lamberty, Garvey 
and Robinson, 1997; Degllnnocenti, Agren and Backman, 1998). ) There may also be 
particular qualities of basic learning processes that may influence the learning of 
affectively valenced information. Future research that investigates the learning and re­
learning of hedonically toned information may shed light on some of the basic 
principles by which cognitive representations become associated with affective tone.
ICS is an extremely complex model, necessarily so Teasdale & Barnard might argue. 
It’s utility to clinical psychological research and treatment remains to be shown. It can 
readily provide research hypotheses, from which more specific accounts of normal and 
pathological processes may be developed and tested. A major conceptual issue which 
Teasdale and Barnard do not address however, is the lack of definition of implicational 
representations, which sheds doubt upon the ICS models ability to produce testable 
hypotheses. Because the concept of implicational meaning is presented (cf. Teasdale, 
1997, p.88), as generic, prototypical of recurring themes of experience, holistic, 
abstract, felt senses, not easily defined in words, it makes it very difficult to 
operationalise any test of the ICS model. Implicational meaning is extremely difficult to 
measure, which has left researchers designing studies which infer implicational 
processing, rather than directly manipulating or measuring the process (see for 
example, Teasdale, Lloyd and Hutton, 1998). Given the potential to an understanding 
of cognitive-affective interaction suggested by The ICS framework, future empirical and 
theoretical work is needed to determine whether Teasdale and Barnard’s theory can be 
successfully operationalised.
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Figure 1: The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model
Object Code
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Propositional Meaning
Body -
State
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EMOTION
For simplicity, the arrows have been represented as indicating a one way flow of 
information between systems. Teasdale and Barnard’s model shows a ‘data matrix’ in 
which all possible connections may be made. The above diagram is a heuristic 
representation of their model to help to illustrate, rather than a detailed exposition of ICS 
in diagrammatic form
Figure 2: The Synthesis of Higher Order Meanings From 
Lower Order Representational Codes
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2a: Raw sensory perceptions encoded as visual code
2b. Positioning of elements of visual code synthesise object level 
representation
I
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2c. Change of positioning of elements of visual code changes 
propositional meaning
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Continuing development in the field of clinical cognitive theory has led to a 
number of information processing accounts of the maintenance of 
depression. One such account, The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems 
Model (ICS)(Teasdale & Barnard 1993) suggests that depression is 
maintained by depressive interlock. Interlock is thought to be a tendency 
for the repetitive synthesis of depression related patterns of information 
processing, at the expense of other patterns of information processing. In 
a sense, interlock is mental “stuckness.”
One of the flaws of the ICS account is that it’s very theoretical richness 
gives rise to many hypotheses but few predictions. It is a framework that 
appears to explain everything, whilst predicting nothing.
The process by which interlock operates requires elaboration if the 
concept is to usefully inform clinical and research practice. It is suggested 
that an experimental study, using a modified version of the paired 
associate learning task (PA) to create “novel concepts” of varying hedonic 
tone will lead to a more precise account of the information processing 
phenomena known as interlock.
From its earliest inception, The Cognitive Model of Psychopathology (Beck 
1967) has proved useful, in both the clinical and research fields, in
understanding depression.
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Beck and others have, however, failed to be satisfied with the cognitive 
model and have continued to research, revise and refine the theory, 
seeking greater and greater clarity, understanding and empirical validity.
Different research groups have developed, each choosing a specific 
aspect of information processing in which to account for the cognitive 
characteristics of the depressed individual. Bower, for example, has 
investigated the effects of mood on memory processes, stating that mood 
alters the retrieval process in a mood congruent manner, such that in 
depressed mood, life events related to loss / depression are more easily 
retrieved (Bower, 1981). Williams similarly has investigated cognition in 
depression in terms of memory. Williams’ account focuses, however, on 
the impaired ability of depressed individuals to retrieve specific memories. 
According to Williams, it is the overgenerality of memory in depressed 
mood that maintains depression (Williams & Dritschel 1988).
Recent theoretical insights into cognitive-emotive links have led to the 
development of the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model. (ICS) 
(Teasdale and Barnard 1993). It is a general model of human information 
processing that provides a framework for understanding information 
processing occurring in any situation, disordered or normal.
The ICS framework also attempts to account for clinical observations 
relating to “hot vs. cold cognition”, or knowing with the heart vs. knowing 
with the head. The ICS model suggests that "knowing” is the result of 
particular patterns of information processing and that there exists two
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qualitatively distinct processes by which something is known. These are 
suggested to be; a propositional level of knowing, similar to verbal / 
semantic definitions. At this level things are “known” in an easily 
understood semantic form, e.g. The capital of Scotland is Edinburgh.
The ICS model states that a second type of knowing exists; namely 
Implicational Knowing. Information processed at this level synthesises 
input from other levels (e.g. Propositional, body-state information, and 
acoustic patterns) and represents that information as to its implications for 
the individual. Knowledge represented at an implicational level is said to 
be difficult to accurately convey as it is generic, holistic, and representative 
of recurring regularities of experience. This level of representation is 
closest to Beck’s concept of the schema (Beck 1976). One of the features 
of the ICS analysis is the proposal that thinking in depression tends to be 
negative, self-focused and is repetitive.
Teasdale describes this phenomenon of repetitive synthesis of patterns of 
information processing related to negative meanings as “Depressive 
Interlock.” Interlock is said to be akin to being “stuck in a particular frame 
of mind” and Teasdale further argues that Interlock is a key factor in the 
maintenance of depression.
The ICS model is ambitious, complex and explicitly cognitive in its 
conceptual foundations. Its complexity is, however, its downfall. It has 
been described as a framework for developing hypotheses, rather than a 
complete theory, “The problem may be that there is too much explanatory 
power in the absence of precise predictions” (Mathews & Macleod, 1994).
Aims and 
Hypotheses 
to Be Tested
Participants
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The ICS account has the potential to guide and inform a major strand of 
clinical and research work. The account itself is too large to approach in a 
single study. A more fruitful approach may be to deal with different aspects 
of the account in piecemeal fashion, to refine our understanding of the 
different processes of the model in such a way that it will more readily 
inform clinical practice.
It is suggested that a modified version of the paired associate learning task 
may be a useful and innovative tool for “unpacking” the nature of interlock 
and understanding the processes it involves.
1. Is Thinking Stuck in Depression?
2. Is this Specific To Negative Thoughts or a General Feature of Thinking 
in Depression?
Participants will be 30 moderately depressed patients, aged 18 -65, male 
or female, being seen by psychologists in the primary care sector. They 
will be screened for severity of depression using the Beck Depression 
Inventory (criterion of moderate depression = score between 15 and 30). 
Depression will be confirmed using the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSMIV (SCID IV). Patients will be excluded on the basis of known organic 
pathology, co-morbid psychiatric disorder such as psychotic or bipolar 
disorder, presence of alcohol or drug dependency problems and 
personality disorders. They will be recruited through their contact with a 
primary care clinical psychologist.
Controls will also be male or female, aged 1 8 -6 5 ,  screened for the above
Plan of 
Investigation
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and will be recruited from non-clinical NHS and University staff through 
poster advertisement. 30 participants in the control group will also be 
recruited.
The current study proposes that the PA task be constructed with real 
words paired with pronounce-able non-word trigrams, such as NIF and 
CIR. These trigrams have no meaning to the participants. The real word 
pairs would be selected to reflect concepts of positive, negative and 
neutral hedonic tone, and would be matched for concreteness, 
imageability, frequency in the English language and degree of pleasant / 
unpleasantness. These features of words have been established as 
influencing PA performance. Watkins et. al. (1992), Anderson (1968) and 
Montague & Keiss (1967), have carried out the necessary pilot work to 
control for these variables, the word lists used will be the taken from these 
sources.
Participants are presented the trigram -  real word pairs and then asked to 
supply the trigram when presented with the real word. Participants are 
given ongoing feedback on their performance as this has also been shown 
to improve PA performance. After association with affectively meaningful 
words the trigrams are assumed to ‘borrow’ corresponding hedonic tone 
and are therefore an experimental analogue of the propositional mental 
representations that Teasdale argues are subject to interlock in 
depression.
Participants will continue to be presented with the associations until their 
recall accuracy is 100 %. Using the well established norms from the PA 
test from the Weschler Memory Scale -  Revised and a one person
Measures
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“dummy run” of the procedure involving an associate of the proposer, it is 
anticipated that the majority of participants will achieve this criteria within 8 
presentations.
In the second phase of the study, the same trigrams would then be paired 
with the opposite toned real word. Neutral pairs would be randomised 
within themselves as a measure of “baseline” interference. The PA task 
would then be re-run using the new word -  trigram pairs.
It is predicted that there will be some interference from learning in trial 1 on 
performance on trial 2. There will, however, be a differential effect 
according to the emotional tone of the words. It is further predicted that 
interference will be greatest when learning positive category trigrams in 
phase 2 that were previously paired with negative words in phase 1.
It is predicted that this effect will be seen more strongly for depressed 
participants than controls. Outcome will be measured as amount of 
interference from learning in phase 1 on performance on phase 2.
Ratings will be required of participant’s mood. This will be measured using 
a standardised rating scale, the Beck Depression Inventory.
To control for possible confounding variables, The National Adult Reading 
test will be used to provide a quick measure of intellectual ability.
A previous study by DeRosiers and Robinson (1992) has also shown that 
scores on the Eysenck Personality Inventory influenced performance on
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an emotional paired associate task. This will also be used as a covariate.
Design & 
Procedure
The main measure will be number of trials to meet 100% accuracy criteria 
in phase 2 minus number of trials to meet same criteria in trial 1. This 
represents amount of interference from trial 1 on learning in trial 2.
The study will use an experimental design with between and within group 
comparisons. The between group will be healthy vs. depressed 
participants. The within group variable is hedonic tone of the words. The 
NART and EPI will be measured and used as covariates.
During the running of the study, participant’s depression (and lack of for 
controls) will be confirmed using the SCID IV. They will then be asked to 
complete the Beck Depression Inventory and the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory. They will then be administered the NART.
After the NART they will be read a list of 6 real word -  trigram pairs. They 
will then be presented with the word and asked to recall the trigram that 
went with it. They will be given ongoing feedback on their performance as 
this has been shown to enhance performance. This sequence will be 
repeated until participants have achieved 100 % accuracy.
In phase two of the experiment the trigrams will be paired with words of 
opposite hedonic tone, while the neutral category will be switched within 
itself. The task will be run again as before. Number of trials to 100 % 
success on trial two minus number of trials to 100% success on trial one is 
the outcome variable and is interpreted as interference from trial one on 
learning in trial two. It is anticipated that if “depressive interlock” exists,
Settings & 
Equipment
Data Analysis
Practical
Applications
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there will be significantly more interference for the depressed group when 
learning a positive association on trial two which was previously 
associated with a negative word on trial one.
The study will be carried out in an adult primary care setting and will 
require no special equipment.
The BDI, The NART, The EPI and SCID IV will be required.
Data will be of ratio level measurement as it is based on observable counts 
of behaviour that have a true zero and equal intervals between increments. 
A 2 x 2 Analysis of Covariance will be applied to the group means, using 
depressed versus healthy participants as one comparison and hedonic 
tone of responses as the other. Intelligence (as measured by the NART) 
and personality (as measured by the EPI) will be held as covariates. These 
statistical techniques are readily accessible using SPSS software. Post 
hoc comparisons are planned as follows: interference in shifting category 
from negative to positive, interference in shifting category from positive to 
negative, interference in shifting category from neutral to different neutral, 
each comparison being repeated for differences between depressed 
versus healthy subjects. SPSS offers a range of techniques for adjusting 
for the increased Type 1 error rate when performing multiple comparisons, 
The Bonferroni Correction being a frequently used option.
An emerging strand in psychological therapies research appears to be the 
focus on “process” over “content” issues. Examples include Adrian Wells’s 
recent work on Meta-Cognition in Anxiety as well as cognitive treatments 
for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.
Timescales
Ethical
Approval
Power
Calculation
Greater understanding of the process (rather than content) of information 
processing in mood disorder is likely to facilitate the development of more 
specific, and therefore more efficient, forms of psychological therapy.
The actual experiment will be likely to take one hour of participant’s time. It 
is anticipated that 20 -  30 participants per group will be recruited. Total 
time for completion of the study is envisaged at ten months.
Application completed and submitted concurrently with academic proposal.
Watkins et al. (1996), report a study in which depressed and healthy 
subjects were presented with affectively negative, positive and neutral 
words. They were then required to free associate to previously unseen 
cues. Their main dependant measure was the number of previously 
presented words subjects spontaneously produced during the free 
association phase. This was reported by the authors to be a 
“conceptually driven implicit memory task”. Using this task Watkins et al. 
demonstrate an implicit mood congruent memory bias, such that 
depressed participants gave more negative previously studied words 
during their free associations, whilst the non-depressed participants 
produced more positive previously studied words. This main effect of 
implicit memory is assumed to underpin the learning required in the 
Mod-PAL task and although dissimilar, is the closest empirical data 
available upon which to base a power calculation.
In their experiment, however, the words were free recalled. This is 
assumed to be a relatively easier task than that proposed in the current
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study, producing large numbers of “words recalled.” To reflect the 
greater difficulty of the current study, Watkins et al.’s results have been 
consistently divided by a factor of ten, to arrive at figures that are 
anticipated to reflect the relative magnitude and direction of the main 
experimental effect.
No study has yet investigated the second “set shift” part of the proposed 
study. Power has therefore been calculated to reflect the differential 
effect (based upon mood congruent implicit memory) that is anticipated 
in part one of the study. It is assumed that experimental effects 
observed in part two will be of adequate power.
The power calculation was performed using the University of California, 
department of statistics Power calculation web site. A two sample, 
unequal variance model was used.
HEDONIC 
TONE OF 
WORD
DEPRESSED GROUP CONTROL GROUP
mean S.D. Mean S.D.
negative 6.4 1.4 4.7 1.8
Required 
sample size 14 11
P < 0.05 (one tailed test) Power required > 0.8
The above figures represent numbers of previously studied words recalled during a 
free association task, reflecting an implicit memory bias based upon non-conscious 
priming or activation of the words. The current study is more complex than this, though 
these figures reflect the power required for the separate main effects. As the current 
study proposes an interaction between mood and hedonic tone, if the main effect is of 
similar magnitude to that observed by Watkins et al. the sample size will be adequate 
to detect such interaction effects. Results will be subject to statistical analysis using a 2
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x 2 ANCOVA. It is proposed that between 20 -  30 participants per condition be 
recruited, in order to render the results more generalisable.
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Amendment to Major Research Project Proposal
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Over the course of the study, a number of amendments were required to the study as
follows:
1. It became clear during the first 3 months that recruiting only from the primary care 
sector would not be adequate to reach the numbers required. 4 Community Mental 
Health Teams were therefore approached, who agreed to participate in the study. 
The recruitment and selection criteria remained broadly unchanged, though 
individuals scoring more than 30 on the BDI were included in the study.
2. Despite these efforts, only 14 patients were recruited, instead of the 30 anticipated. 
This is still adequate for the power calculation and statistical requirements, though 
was a somewhat disappointing return, given the prevalence of the disorder.
3. It was originally proposed to recruit control participants through NHS administration 
staff. Preliminary discussions regarding this revealed people would be unlikely to 
give up the time required. The control group was therefore recruited from 
colleagues and associates of the author who gave their free time to participate.
4. The original outcome measure in the study was to be number of trials to 100% 
criteria. Although the first 5 patients recruited satisfied this criterion, not all patients 
learned the associations to 100% criteria. Likewise there were similar numbers of 
people in the control group who did not reach 100% criteria. A new outcome 
measure was therefore defined, which involved categorising individuals’ errors as 
random or perseverative (see Major Project Research Paper, p. 64). This measure 
is still thought to reflect differential interference on memory of hedonic tone.
MAJOR RESEARCH PROJECT PAPER
Submitted as part of the research portfolio for the degree of
Doctor of Clinical Psychology 
by
DAVID GILLANDERS 
1st August 2000
An experimental investigation of repetitive thinking in depression. 
JOURNAL: The Journal of Abnormal Psychology
DAVID GILLANDERS
University of Glasgow 
Department of Psychological Medicine 
Gartnavel Royal Hospital, 1055 Great Western Road 
Glasgow, G12 OXH.
+00 44 141 / 211 3920
dgillanders@ggpct.scot.nhs.uk
62
An experimental investigation of repetitive thinking in depression
The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model (ICS, Teasdale and 
Barnard, 1993), predicts that depression is associated with a 
repetitive style of information processing. The current study 
empirically investigated this prediction, using an experimental 
methodology to compare the processing of affectively valenced 
material by depressed (n = 14) and non-depressed individuals (n = 
14). It was also predicted that such repetitive processing would be 
observed more strongly for negative, compared to positive or neutral 
stimuli. Results indicated support for the hypothesis that depression 
would be associated with repetitive information processing, but only 
partial support for the hypothesis that this would be seen more 
strongly for negative material. The results are interpreted as 
providing preliminary empirical support for the ICS model. 
Implications for psychological therapies for depression are 
discussed.
Introduction
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Previous research in the experimental, neuropsychological and clinical fields has 
indicated that vulnerability to recurring episodes of major depressive disorder, as well 
as length and severity of individual depressive episodes may be influenced by a 
ruminative response style (see Gillanders, 2000). A ruminative response style is 
thought to be a relatively stable, trait-like dispositional tendency (Just and Alloy, 1997), 
and is thought to be underpinned by a repetitive style of information processing. This 
repetitive style of information processing is thought to develop from attempts to 
regulate affect in the face of losses of important sources of self-esteem (Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987). It is thought to confer vulnerability to recurrent major depression 
when repetitive information processing occurs as a habitual response to depressed 
mood.
The experimental and correlational studies that make up the Response Styles Theory 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990), have also suggested that repetitive information processing 
may be linked to the severity and duration of episodes of depressed affect. These 
studies have measured repetitive information processing using self-report 
questionnaires such as the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ, Morrow and Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1990). The RSQ invites respondents to indicate which of a variety of 
responses they typically make to depressed affect. None of these studies have 
attempted to verify the accuracy of respondents reported responses. Furthermore, 
these studies have tended to conceptualise the tendency to ruminate or distract ones- 
self from depressed mood and negative thinking as a relatively controllable 
phenomenon in which people choose which type of response to make.
Gillanders (2000) has drawn upon a variety of sources to indicate that ruminative 
responding to depressed affect may be much less controllable than the Response 
Styles Theory would suggest. It is suggested that the tendency to ruminate may be
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based upon differences in information processing between depressed and non­
depressed people and that this repetitive style of information processing may be 
related to the hedonic tone or affective meaning of the material upon which depressed 
people ruminate.
Teasdale & Barnard (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) have outlined a conceptual 
framework, The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (ICS), within which a wide 
variety of psychological phenomena may be investigated. At the cornerstone of the ICS 
analysis of information processing in depression is the concept of depressive interlock. 
In essence depressive interlock refers to depressed individuals’ disposition to become 
‘stuck’ in a particular mode of information processing, a phenomena which Teasdale 
and Barnard (1993), have suggested leads to the maintenance of major depressive 
disorder. Depressive Interlock may be a useful concept in understanding the cognitive 
-  affective process that may underpin the ruminative phenomena described by the 
Response Styles Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990).
Teasdale and Barnard (1993), have argued that repetitive information processing in 
depression is theoretically underpinned by continuing interactions between 
implicational level meanings and propositional meanings (see Teasdale, 1997). 
According to Teasdale and Barnard (1993), in depression, the processing of specific 
propositional meanings is likely (though not inevitably) to lead to the synthesis of 
implicational models which have previously been associated with the processing of that 
specific propositional code. The implicational meanings are associated with the 
production of emotion, in this instance sadness. The implicational model that evokes 
sadness will also lead to the synthesis of specific meanings related to the experience of 
depressed affect (propositional meanings). These propositional meanings may then 
feed back into the continuing synthesis of implicational models, engendering further 
depressed affect. This is the process which Teasdale and Barnard refer to as 
‘depressive interlock’. They argue that depressive interlock is relatively uncontrollable,
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in that the persons’ information processing configuration becomes stuck in this 
particular loop.
The current study sought to investigate the phenomenon of repetitive information 
processing in depression in order to subject an element of the theoretical ICS model to 
empirical test, thereby attempting to add to the growing body of research that seeks to 
establish whether ICS is a useful construct for the study of psychopathological 
phenomena (see for example Gumley and Power, 2000; Gumley, White and Power, 
1999). The current study also sought to empirically investigate whether repetitive 
information processing is a feature in depression at a pre-conscious level, in 
contradiction to the conceptualisation of relatively conscious choice implied by the 
Response Styles Theory (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).
The Current Study
Hypotheses
In line with the theoretical predictions of the ICS framework two hypotheses were 
tested:
Information processing is more prone to repetition in depressed people 
compared to non-depressed people.
H2: Repetitive information processing will be more likely to be seen for information
with affectively negative tone than for similar material with either positive or 
neutral affective tone.
To test these hypotheses, an information processing task was designed which involved 
participants learning associations between novel verbal stimuli in the form of
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consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) trigrams and hedonically neutral, negative and 
positive personality trait adjectives, which they had previously rated for how well they 
felt each described them. Once these associations had been learned, the same CVC 
trigrams were paired with oppositely toned adjectives. Trigrams that had been paired 
with neutral adjectives were paired with different neutral adjectives, whilst trigrams 
paired with positive adjectives were paired with negative adjectives and vice-versa.
This cognitive-affective learning task was based upon the Paired Associate Learning 
Task (PAL) of the Weschler Memory Scale - Revised (WMS-R), (Weschler, 1987), and 
was named the Modified Paired Associate Learning Task (Mod-PAL).
The Mod-PAL uses 6 affectively positive, neutral and negative personality trait 
descriptors. These words were in the neutral category; hesitant and average; in the 
negative category; hostile and rude and in the positive category; kind and helpful. 
Considerable care was taken in selecting words that were matched according to 
frequency in the English language, concreteness and meaningfulness (see Anderson, 
1968). The words are assumed only to differ significantly in terms of affective tone. 
These hedonically toned words are paired with consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) 
trigrams, which have been matched for their associability (see Montague & Keiss, 
1967).
In order to engender implicational processing, thereby attenuating the different 
emotional tones of the words, the 6 personality trait descriptors were first presented in 
random order to participants, who were asked to consider each word carefully as to 
how well they felt each word described them. Although this presents participants with a 
propositional meaning, the self-referencing and holistic nature of the evaluation they 
were asked to perform is thought to lead to the synthesis of an implicational meaning 
(i.e. a holistic -  felt sense representation of the construct behind each word, in relation
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to themselves). These implicational models, having been primed, will be more readily 
accessed when the personality adjectives are then presented during the Mod-PAL.
When the personality trait words are paired with the novel propositions (the CVC 
trigrams), it is anticipated that part of the affective tone will be associated with the CVC 
trigram. When the CVC trigram is then re-associated with a differently toned adjective, 
it is anticipated that the prior learning will interfere with the new association. In 
essence, the initial CVC trigram will become stuck, inhibiting the new learning. It is 
hypothesised that this will be seen least for neutral stimuli and most for negative stimuli 
and that this effect will be seen more strongly for depressed compared to non­
depressed participants.
The Mod-PAL was considered to be an experimental analogue of the process of 
interlock, in that the prior self-rating of the personality adjectives would result in 
participants accessing implicational models of the self in relation to each adjctive, for 
example ‘self as hostile’, ‘self as kind’ etc. When presented with each adjective in the 
Mod-PAL, the implicational model of self is thought to be activated and is immediately 
paired with a novel propositional representation, in the form of the CVC trigram. When 
participants are then required to re-leam the associations, the interlock process 
hypothesised to exist during depression should lead participants to access the original 
trigram (propositional representation) with which each adjective (and its associated 
self-related implicational representation) was paired. This process will interfere with 
learning the new adjective-trigram pairs.
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Method
Participants
Participants in the experimental group (n = 14, 5 males, 9 females) were recruited 
through their contact with mental health professionals In the primary care sector or 
community mental health team. Mental health workers were asked to identify persons 
for whom depression was a primary complaint but to exclude potential participants on 
the basis of co-morbid drug or alcohol problems, known organic pathology, diagnosed 
personality disorder and age range of 1 8 - 6 5  years. Anxiety symptoms were not 
criteria for exclusion. Whilst participants were therefore a doubly selected sample (i.e. 
their key workers identified who would be suitable and they consented to be in the 
study) they were considered nonetheless a relatively representative sample of the adult 
depressed population in urban Scotland.
Having been identified by their key workers, participants were required to meet 
diagnostic criteria for a current major depressive episode, which was confirmed using 
the mood disorders section of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM IV (SCID IV), 
(First, Spitzer, Gibbon and Williams, 1996).
Participants in the control group (n = 14, 6 males, 8 females) were recruited through 
associates of the author. They were in the age range 1 8 - 6 5 ,  and were not paid for 
their participation. They were screened using the SCID IV to confirm that they were not 
currently experiencing an episode of major depression.
Demographic variables are reported for the experimental and control groups in Table 1.
(Insert Table 1 Here)
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Materials
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) One of the most widely used self-report measures, 
the BDI (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961) assesses the presence and 
severity of a number of somatic, affective, cognitive and motivational symptoms of 
depression over the previous week.
Personality Self-Ratings (PSR) The 6 personality words which formed the Modified 
Paired Associate Learning Task were presented alongside 100 mm visual analogue 
scales which were anchored with the words, “not like me at air on the left hand side 
and “a lot like me” on the right. Participants were asked to “spend a moment 
considering each word carefully as to how well it described their personality and to 
make a clear mark across the line according to how well they felt each word described 
them.”
Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI) The EPI is a 57 item, forced choice self-report 
measure that measures the personality dimensions of neuroticism and extraversion 
(Eysenck and Eysenck, 1964). It was included in the present study as a covariate, as 
previous research involving memory for affective material had demonstrated that 
neuroticism significantly influenced participants’ responses, irrespective of depression 
status (desRosiers and Robinson, 1992).
National Adult Reading Test (NART) The NART is a very brief measure of reading 
ability, consisting of 50 irregularly spelled words whose pronunciation can not be 
deduced by following grapheme to phoneme rules (e.g. drachm). Number of errors is 
used to calculate equivalent WAIS-R IQ scores. Typically used as a test of premorbid 
intelligence, its use in this instance is as a brief screening measure of intellectual 
ability, as suggested by desRosiers and Robinson (1992).
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM IV (SCID IV) The mood disorders section of the 
SCID IV was used to confirm the presence or absence of major depression. The whole 
SCID IV was not administered in order to reduce the time demands upon participants.
Modified Paired Associate Learning Task (Mod-PAL) The Mod-PAL is a specially 
constructed verbal learning task, based upon the Verbal Paired Associates Test of the 
Weschler Memory Scale -  Revised (Weschler, 1987). Hedonically negative, neutral 
and positively toned personality trait adjectives (from Anderson, 1968), are paired with 
three letter consonant-vowel-consonant trigrams, matched for associability (from 
Montague & Keiss, 1967). The personality trait words are balanced for frequency of 
use in the English language, concreteness and meaningfulness.
The 6 personality-trait - CVC pairs are presented orally by the examiner at the rate of 
one per second. Participants are then given the personality words and are required to 
recall the CVC trigram with which it was associated. Feedback is given immediately 
and if incorrect the correct answer is supplied, as suggested by Weschler (Weschler, 
1987, p. 24). In each presentation set the order of presentation and the order in which 
participants are required to recall the trigrams are randomised. The six pairs are 
presented until participants have learned all six associations to 100% accuracy, or 
have completed nine presentations. In the second part of the Mod-PAL, CVC trigrams 
previously associated with a positively toned personality adjective are presented paired 
with a negatively toned adjective, whilst trigrams previously associated with negatively 
toned adjectives are paired with positively toned adjectives. Trigrams previously paired 
with neutral adjectives are paired with different neutral adjectives. The presentation 
procedure is then followed in exactly the same fashion, until participants have learned 
the new associations to 100% accuracy, or they have been presented the pairs nine 
times. The nine trial limit was selected to limit the duration of the experiment for each 
participant.
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Procedure
Having consented to be involved in the study, participants were offered an appointment 
at a convenient time. They were seen in the building in which they usually attended for 
mental health services in the case of the experimental group, or in a familiar setting for 
the control group.
After settling participants into the setting, demographic data such as age, medication 
and treatment status were collected, participants were administered the mood 
disorders subsection of the SCID IV, followed by the BDI. Participants then completed 
the PSR. After the PSR, participants were administered the Mod-PAL.
The two versions of the Mod-PAL were presented in counterbalanced order. The NART 
was administered between presentations of the two versions of the Mod-PAL, to serve 
as a distracter task. Participants then completed the EPI. Finally, a full de-briefing was 
carried out, during which participants’ perceptions of the study were assessed, 
including whether they had been able to determine the hypotheses of the study as well 
as whether any part of the procedure had caused them distress. No participant found 
the procedure unduly distressing, all responded favourably to the debriefing and 
explanation of the study’s hypotheses. During the debriefing it was evident that the 
studies’ hypotheses had remained obscured to all participants. The order in which 
participants learned each list did not affect their performance.
Analysis
Analysis was performed using SPSS for Windows, version 9.0.0 (SPSS Inc., 1998). 
Individual’s responses to the Mod-PAL were coded as correct or incorrect. Participants’ 
incorrect responses were further coded as follows;
72
Where an incorrect response was given that had not previously been given for that 
word, it was scored as a random error. Where a response was given which the 
participant had previously been told was wrong for that word, it was categorised as a 
within trial perseverative error. Where a participant supplied a response that had been 
correct in Trial A but was now no longer correct, this was categorised as a between trial 
perseverative error.
Because individuals in both groups differed according to their overall number of errors, 
the compute command was used to determine for each participant the proportion of 
their total errors that was made up of each type of error, for each category of hedonic 
tone, positive, negative and neutral. These proportions were expressed as percentages 
to facilitate understanding of the data and were entered into a 2 x 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA 
design. The first factor in the design was a between groups factor of group, with two 
levels; experimental group and control group. The second factor was the within 
subjects factor of hedonic tone of the words, with three levels; positive, negative and 
neutral. The third factor was the within subjects factor of error type with 3 levels; 
proportion of random errors, proportion of within trial perseverative errors and 
proportion of between trial perseverative errors.
For both designs, Eysenck Personality Inventory Neuroticism scores and NART scores 
were entered as co-variates, as described by desRosiers and Robinson (desRosiers 
end Robinson, 1992).
Mauchley’s test of sphericity indicated that the dependant variables did not depart 
significantly from the assumption of equal variance (Approx. Chi-square, TONE, 5.722, 
p = .06; ERROR, 1.684, p = .428).
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Results
There were no significant main effects or interactions in learning the initial associations 
(Mod-PAL trial A, GROUP x TONE x ERROR; F(2,48) = 1.038, p=0.362). This 
suggests that there were no between groups differences in learning the initial 
associations, for any tone of stimuli.
Table 2 shows the mean proportions of the total errors in trial B, made up by each type 
of error, for each tone of stimuli for each group.
(Insert Table 2 here)
Hypothesis 1
On the basis of the ICS model, it was hypothesised that depression would be 
associated with a higher proportion of perseverative to random errors. This hypothesis 
was examined using the anova model described above. There was no main effect for 
GROUP (F (i,24)=. 635, p=. 433). There were significant two-way interaction effects for 
GROUP x ERROR TYPE (F (2.4e r 3 -790 . P= 029), and TONE x ERROR TYPE (F 
(4,96)=2.580, p=0.042). There was also a significant three-way interaction effect for 
TONE x ERROR x NEUROTICISM (F (496)=4.434, p=.002).
Selected means were subjected to post-hoc comparison, using between subjects and 
repeated measures t-tests, where appropriate, to unravel the phenomena being 
observed within the significant interactions described. For each variable, where 
multiple comparisons are made, a statistical adjustment is required to control for the 
increased chance of making a Type 1 error. The Bonferonni correction is typically used, 
though SPSS lacks the facility to perform post hoc comparisons when using a mixed 
ANOVA design. The Bonferroni correction involves dividing the desired level of
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significance, in this case 0.05, by the number of comparisons being made. This results 
in a very conservative criterion, for example if comparing three means the Bonferroni 
adjusted values for a p < 0.05 would be 0.05 / 3 = 0.016. This means that the 
probability of any particular value of T must be less than 0.016, if we are to be sure that 
the result is significant at below the 0.05 level. The Bonferroni correction was applied to 
each of the comparisons where a particular mean was subject to more than one 
comparison. This procedure is described where appropriate for each result.
Across all tones of words, the control group made proportionately more random errors 
than the experimental group, and this difference was significant: (neutral, 22.86% vs’ 
10.6%, T (26) =-2.519, p=0.018; negative, 23.9% vs’ 12.03%, T (26)=-3.255, p=.003; 
positive, 17.2% vs’ 10.86%, T (26)=3.38, p=0.016). Furthermore, compared to the control 
group, the experimental group made proportionately more within trial perseverative 
errors for negative words (15.3% vs’ 4.6%, T (26) =3.38, p=.002) and positive words 
(14.9% vs’ 7.7%, T(26) =2.068, p=0.049), but not for neutral words (6.6% vs’ 3.4%,T(26) = 
1.37, p=0.190).
The expected difference between groups for between trial perseverations was not 
observed for any tone of material (neutral, 13.8% vs’ 6.16%, T (26) =1.7, p=0.101; 
negative, 8.03% vs’ 8.5%, T (26) =-.122, p=0.904; positive, 7.28% vs' 5.6%, T (26) =0.633, 
p=0.513).
The above results suggest that depressed participants’ original learning does not get 
‘stuck’ when the associations are re-learned in the second Mod-PAL trial. What 
appears to occur is that they perseverate upon an incorrect response unrelated to the 
initial association that was correct during trial 1 of the Mod-PAL. This does not occur for 
neutral material, but does occur for negative and positive material.
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Whilst the finding that between trial perseveration did not differ between groups is 
contrary to the relationship expected, the results do indicate that the control group tend 
to be random in their errors, whilst the experimental group are considerably less 
random, indicative of a higher overall level of repetitive responding. For this reason, 
perseverative error types were collapsed to reflect random errors versus all types of 
perseverative errors. T tests were again used to compare overall levels of 
perseveration for each tone of material, between groups. Perseveration was equally 
spread across the different tones of material, though for all material the experimental 
group evidenced significantly more perseverative responses than the control group 
(neutral words, 20.5% vs’ 9.6%, T (26) =2.431, p=.022; negative words, 23.3% vs’ 13%, 
T (26) =3.085, p=0.005; positive words, 22.2% vs’ 13.3%, T(26) =2.039, p=0.05).
It is of note that whilst all of these are significant, the strongest difference is observed 
for negative material. These results are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that 
depression is associated with a repetitive pattern of information processing.
Hypothesis 2
It was hypothesised that the repetitive pattern of information processing predicted by 
the ICS account of cognitive-affective interaction would be most clearly observed when 
depressed individuals are required to process material with negative hedonic tone. This 
hypothesis was tested using paired sample t-tests to compare errors between different 
tones of material, within each group. Bonferroni adjustments are described where 
relevant.
Depressed participants, made more within trial perseverative errors for negative 
material than neutral material (15.3% vs’ 6.6%, T (i3) =2.76, p=0.016,) and for positive 
material compared to neutral material (14.9% vs’ 6.6%, T (i3) = -3.01, p=0.010). No 
difference in within trial perseveration was observed between positive and negative
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material (15.3% vs5 14.9%, T (i3) = .114, p=.911). Three comparisons were made, 
therefore the critical value of p = 0.016, indicating that even with strict criterion the 
above relationships are significant at p < 0.05.
Furthermore, the experimental group also made more between trial perseverations for 
neutral material than for negative material (13.85 vs’ 8.03%, T (13) = 2.43, p=0.03), but 
not for positive material (13.85% vs’ 7.28%, T (13) =1.327, p=.207). This result is 
contrary to the relationship expected. The Bonferroni correction with 2 comparisons is 
0.025, indicating that the significant difference between negative and neutral between 
trial perseverative errors may be a statistical artefact, the significance of this result is 
therefore treated with caution.
None of these relationships were observed in the control group, suggesting that they 
respond similarly across the different tones of material. The observation that the 
experimental group make more within trial perseverative errors to negatively toned 
material than to neutrally toned stimuli lends support to the hypothesis that a repetitive 
pattern of information processing would be most strongly seen for negative material. 
The observation that positive material is also more prone than neutral to within trial 
perseverative errors is contrary to the hypothesis, as is the finding that more between 
trial perseverations occur for neutral stimuli than negative. This result is treated with 
caution as described above.
With caution, however, it appears that the negative associations are not more likely to 
‘get stuck’ as predicted, but that the neutral associations are. Negative material is more 
prone than neutral material to repetitive processing, though not as predicted. The 
negative associations are more likely to be incorrectly recalled, the errors made are 
then more likely to be perseverated upon. That this effect is also seen for positive 
material is difficult to interpret. It may be related to mutual interference on memory of 
these stimuli (as they are swapped between them), leading people to be more likely to
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make an erroneous response, which is then perseverated. Whilst these results pose 
difficulty in accepting the second hypothesis, the fact that such differential effects for 
tone are only observed in the experimental group does lend support to the hypothesis 
that the hedonic tone of information is relevant to the degree to which it is vulnerable to 
repetition. This is interpreted as partial support of the second hypothesis.
Secondary Analysis
Though included in the analysis as a covariate, the highly significant interaction effect 
observed for Eysenck Personality Inventory Neuroticism scores, error type and tone of 
word (F (4,96)=4.434, p=.002), was interesting and deserved closer attention. As would 
be expected, the experimental group had significantly higher neuroticism scores than 
the control group (see for example Watson, Clark and Harkness, 1994). A median split 
of neuroticism scores was used to create groups and the anova model described 
above was performed, using this as the between group variable, instead of depression 
status. Unsurprisingly, similar significant interactions were observed as in the major 
analysis. When Beck Depression Inventory scores were added as a covariate, 
however, the significant effects disappeared, indicating that the difference between 
groups in neuroticism was responsible for the originally observed significant interaction 
effect involving neuroticism.
The interesting tone by neuroticism interaction was further explored, using a correlation 
matrix of neuroticism scores and individuals’ self-ratings of the different personality 
words. This revealed that neuroticism was associated with differential responses to the 
words on the personality self-ratings. In the depressed group high neuroticism was 
associated with a tendency to rate oneself more highly on the negative words (hostile, 
r. = .518, p=0.005; rude, r. =.727, p=.003), Neuroticism was also significantly 
correlated with self-ratings for one of the neutral words (hesitant, r. =0.793, p=0.000). 
In the control group a similar pattern of correlations were observed, except that the
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correlation between neuroticism and self-ratings for rude was not significant (r. =.304, 
p=291).
These correlations lend support to the hypothesis that depressed participants 
differential responding to the hedonically toned stimuli may be underpinned by the 
construct of neuroticism. It is possible that the emotional lability that is at the heart of 
the construct of neuroticism reflects differences in the accesibility of implicational 
models of the self. The degree to which implicational models of the self can be thought 
of as on a ‘hair trigger* will affect how readily individual’s ‘minds’ adopt an interlocked 
processing configuration.
In the personality self-rating task, implicational models of ‘self as rude, self as hostile 
etc.’ may be more readily accessed by individuals who are high in neuroticism, thereby 
differentially affecting the degree to which the affective component becomes 
associated with the CVC trigrams, thus affecting the degree to which such ‘borrowed 
affective valence’ then interferes with the relearning of different stimuli.
Discussion
The current study subjected a prediction of the ICS framework to empirical test and 
found that depression does appear to be associated with higher levels of repetitive 
responding, though not in the manner anticipated. The second prediction, that 
repetitive information processing would be more evidenced for negative than neutral 
material was partially supported.
The type of perseveration observed for negative material was of the perseveration of 
an incorrect response that was not the correct response in the first learning phase. This 
is not the result that was expected and is somewhat difficult to account for. The
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perseveration of incorrect responses indicates that depressed persons show a pattern 
of being unable to inhibit an incorrect response even when provided with corrective 
feedback. An alternative explanation may be that the negative associations did get 
stuck, in that they may have been readily brought to mind by participants, who knew 
that the response was correct in the first trial but now no longer. This sticking could 
inhibit new learning in just the way described, though if the individual knew the 
response was incorrect would not be observed as a between trial perseveration. 
Unfortunately there is no way of knowing whether this account is accurate and it 
remains speculative. It is clear, however, that the type of perseveration of responding 
observed is not that expected. Future empirical work is required to clarify the reasons 
behind this.
The mixed nature of this result may be related to the finding that high neuroticism 
scores lead participants to differentially respond to the affectively valenced information 
during the personality self-rating task. Neuroticism was highly correlated with the rating 
of oneself as hesitant. Though these words had been chosen because they had 
previously been rated by over 1000 people as to their hedonic tone (Anderson, 1968), it 
could be that people with high neuroticism scores do not consider the trait hesitant as 
neutral, but see it as a negative trait, and so respond to it in a similar fashion as they do 
to the words hostile or rude. This may help to explain why neutral words evidenced 
more between trial perseveration than negative or positive words.
Although not exactly as predicted, the results do provide general support for the ICS 
model in that depression does appear to be related to differential responding to 
affectively valenced material which may then influence the degree to which that 
information is prone to a repetitive pattern of information processing. Such patterns of 
repetitive responding are unlikely to be mediated at a conscious level, suggesting that 
the position taken by the Response Styles Theory (that responding to depression with
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distraction or rumination involves a relatively conscious choice, Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990), may be somewhat over-simplified.
The experimental analogue created for the current study is artificial and it can be 
criticised on the grounds of ecological validity. Even within these constraints however, 
differential responding to affectively valenced stimuli were observed. The mechanisms 
by which such effects are mediated are likely to be at a relatively basic level of the way 
in which the cognitive architecture of the mind processes the affective tone of stimuli. 
Such basic cognitive-affective processes may be considered likely to have very far 
reaching effects on more ecologically relevant processes such as autobiographical 
memory, future directed thinking and attributional style.
The current study can further be criticised for recruiting a relatively impure sample. 
Individuals were confirmed as depressed using the SCID IV, other exclusion criteria 
were only screened through the knowledge of the key-worker of the patient, rather than 
being confirmed. Whilst this means that the current sample may have been suffering 
other forms of psychopathology, they did exhibit comparable clinical levels of 
depression. Though it may be argued that this makes attributing the cause of the 
results reported to depression and not another unknown factor, it is considered 
unlikely. The use of a sample such as this does have the advantage that it renders 
generalisation to everyday clinical samples more easy.
Problems in Investigating ICS
One major problem in subjecting the ICS framework to empirical test is in the 
measurement of implicational processing. As mentioned above, interlock refers to the 
continuing interplay between propositional and implicational meanings. Because
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implicational meanings are “deep interrelationships extracted from experience, 
representing holistic, felt senses encoded as prototypical of particular themes, they are 
by definition at a very abstract level, are not easily captured by language and not easily 
conveyed” (cf. Teasdale, 1999, p. 61). This definition makes it very difficult to define an 
adequate test of implicational processing. Previous studies have tended to use 
individuals’ linguistic responses (propositional meaning) in a way which infers 
implicational processing of a particular theme (see for example, Teasdale, Lloyd and 
Hutton, 1998).
Implicational processing is yet to be ‘directly captured’ or measured empirically. It may 
even be that ‘direct’ measurement is conceptually impossible, leading the ICS model to 
adopt a philosophical position uncomfortably akin to psychoanalytic accounts of the 
unconscious, also presented as somewhat ill defined, intangible and not open to direct 
inspection. While these criticisms may pose significant problems for a model pertaining 
to be a “comprehensive account of information processing...in an applied science 
approach” (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993, p. 4), it is commendable in it’s attempt to 
bring the richness of human experience inherent in the construct of implicational 
processing into focus as a legitimate subject of scientific enquiry. To investigate only 
the cognitive processes to which we have conscious access will be likely to provide us 
with an impoverished cognitive psychology. Future studies that attempt to investigate 
ICS would benefit from trying to develop a measurable but ecologically valid method of 
invoking implicational processes. Such an approach would help to resolve the 
philosophical position described above, but would be inherently difficult due to the 
nature of the phenomenon being investigated.
Teasdale & Barnard (1993, p. 73) use a comparison between prose and poetry as an 
illustration of the difference between implicational and propositional meaning. It may be 
that the evocative nature of poetry or art may be one way to engender implicational
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meaning, though this still leaves the problem of how it is to be accurately and reliably 
measured.
Clinical Implications
If (as suggested by the current study) the affective tone of stimuli leads to particular 
processing pathways (and hence response) at a very basic level, individual’s 
experience of these processes in depressed states is likely to be felt as automatic and 
uncontrollable. This may make stable internal attributions for the individual’s feelings 
and behaviour more likely. Attempting to ‘normalise’ the process by imparting (in 
patient-relevant terms) psychological knowledge about the links between repetitive 
information processing and depression may, for some, allow them to create different 
propositional models, such as suggested by Teasdale (1997, p.85-86). The very 
process of psychological therapy may engender the kind of change of implicational 
meanings to which Teasdale refers (i.e. the change from an implicational model of ‘self 
as globally worthless and future as uncontrollable and hopeless’ to ‘depression as a 
psychological state in which I am likely to make unrealistic attributions about my worth 
and the future’.
The automaticity of repetitive information processing may, however, make such models 
very hard to retain, leading the person to fall back into the ‘depressive interlock’ 
configuration readily. Teasdale (1999) argues that the creation of new implicational 
models requires incorporating new elements into existing affect eliciting implicational 
codes. Presumably this requires the synthesis of the unchanged mental model before 
new elements can be incorporated into it. As this mental model encapsulates holistic 
felt senses of the self, built up over the whole of a person’s life experiences it may be 
that conscious awareness of such models are likely to be highly distressing for 
individuals. In such instances, the synthesis of a propositional code that focuses 
conscious attention away from the affect-eliciting implicational model may be negatively
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reinforcing, as it allows short-term avoidance of the distress associated with the 
synthesis of particular implicational models.
Hunt (1999) has argued that ‘the only way out is through’, meaning that focussing one’s 
attention on the unpleasant emotion and bearing it without distraction results in more 
effective emotional processing (Rachman, 1980) than distraction or rationalisation. 
Likewise, Teasdale (1999) argues that mindful experiencing of implicational meanings 
is the most effective processing mode to facilitate emotional processing. This would 
suggest that, for some individuals at least psychotherapy must discover ways of 
working with ‘deep themes’ or ‘holistic senses of the self’ that are difficult to capture 
with language. The discovery of such methods is likely to be challenging, though the 
current theoretical predictions would indicate that such endeavours would be highly 
worthwhile. Future clinical research may falsify or support these theoretical predictions.
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) have shown, however, that distraction results in 
shorter episodes of depressed mood, indicating that introspection may be counter­
productive. A possible solution to this contradiction is that in therapy, the introspecting 
is done within the context of a relationship. Focussing attention on the self may indeed 
be likely to prolong depressed mood, as it is unlikely that new patterns of implicational 
code will be incorporated into existing models. The therapists interventions, 
suggestions and interpretations are more likely to be able to achieve the necessary 
change than solo introspecting as an external source of new information is available in 
the person and demeanour of the therapist.
The above findings suggest a two-stage process may be useful in the treatment of 
depressive disorder. The first stage ought to attempt to break the interlock process in 
whatever way possible, by distraction, pleasurable activity, distancing one’s self from 
negative automatic thoughts by rational challenging. Such efforts should attempt to 
stabilise the individual into a position where interlock is no longer the dominant mode of
processing. Following such stabilisation, however, some patients will require a second 
stage of psychological treatment. This will be necessarily more ‘deep’, involving 
exploration of holistic themes of the self, emotional processing and the incorporation of 
new elements of implicational code (interestingly, this two stage approach is likely to be 
similar to the approach taken by the majority of clinicians in routine clinical practice). 
The dominant tools of most conventional forms of psychological therapy appear to be 
language and relationship. It may be that language is not the most effective tool for the 
second stage of this ‘idealised therapy’. Alternative practices (see for example Amtz 
and Weertman, 1999) therefore require scientific and theoretical scrutiny in the search 
for more effective tools. The ICS framework can provide a framework within which such 
practices may be investigated, which will also help to establish the empirical validity of 
the model.
It is highly likely, however, that if we are to encourage such patients to focus their 
attention on holistic senses of the self that engender unpleasant emotion and expect 
them to bear it successfully to allow emotional processing to occur, relationship factors 
between therapist and patient will be extremely important. That such resurgence in 
interest in the therapeutic relationship in some forms of cognitive behavioural therapies 
(e.g. Davidson, 2000; Linehan, 1993) has been occurring in recent years represents a 
convergence of theoretical predictions and clinical observation and is encouraging.
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Table 1: Demographic Information for Participants
Variable Experimental Group Control Group
Mean SD Mean SD
Age (years) 42.7 9.47 44.21 14.67
Beck Depression 
Inventory
30.64 9.59 5.71 3.22
National Adult Reading 
Test
110 8.51 114 9.77
Eysenk Personality 
Inventory Neuroticism
17.85 3.86 10.71 5.4
Eysenk Personality 
Inventory Extraversion
6 4.2 11 3.86
Months of Contact with 
Mental Health Services
16.42 17.75 0 0
Number of anti depressant 
medications
1.36 1.3 0 0
Frequencies
Gender Male
5
Female
9
Male
6
Female
8
Anti Depressant 
Medication Status
Present
11
Absent
3
Present
0
Absent
14
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Table 2: Proportions of Errors in each category by Tone of Word and Group
CL
3
Po
si
tiv
e
i
Me
an
 
(S
.D
.)
17
.2 
(7
.2
)
5.6
 
(6
.9
8)
7.7
 
(9
.7
)
2
o
T f
0)tf)tf)
2
Q .
<D
7 To
ne
 
of 
W
or
d
N
eg
at
iv
e
Me
an
 
(S
.D
.)
23
.9 
11
.8
)
8.5
 
(1
0.
2)
4.5
9 
(7
.1
)
oz
N
eu
tra
l
Me
an
 
(S
.D
.)
i 2
2.8
6 
(1
5.
6)
6.1
6 
(7
.2
)
3.4
 
(5
.2
)
Q.
Po
si
tiv
e
i
Me
an
 
(S
.D
.)
10
.86
 
(5
.8
)
...
...
...
.
7.2
8 
(6
.3)
 
j
CD
00
o>
3
2
o
•o
0)
tf)
<o
£
Q.
© T
on
e 
of 
W
or
d
N
eg
at
iv
e
Me
an
 
(S
.D
.)
12
.03
 
(6
.8
)
8.0
3 
(9
.9
6)
15
.3 
(9
.5
)
Q
1 
N
eu
tra
l
Me
an
 
(S
.D
.)
10
.6 
(9
.4
)
13
.8 
(1
5.
3)
6.6
6 
(7
.3
6)
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of 
Ra
nd
om
 
Er
ro
rs
 
(%
)
0s
Ty
pe
 
of 
E
rr
or
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of 
be
tw
ee
n 
tr
ia
l 
pe
rs
ev
er
at
iv
e 
er
ro
rs
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of 
wi
th
in
 
tr
ia
l 
pe
rs
ev
er
at
iv
e 
er
ro
rs
SINGLE CASE RESEARCH STUDY
91
submitted as part of the research portfolio for the degree of 
Doctor of Clinical Psychology 
by
DAVID GILLANPERS
University of Glasgow 
Department of Psychological Medicine 
Gartnavel Royal Hospital, 1055 Great Western Road 
Glasgow, G12 OXH
1st August 2000 
TITLE:
Specificity of Treatment Effects of Exposure Response Prevention for Compulsive 
Symptoms in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
JOURNAL Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy
RUNNING HEAD: Specificity of ERP for Compulsive Symptorps
92
Specificity of Treatment Effects of Exposure Response Prevention for 
Compulsive Symptoms in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
Abstract. The last three decades have seen a change in clinician’s 
impressions of the treatability of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). Once 
regarded as chronic and intractable, the application of learning theory has 
provided an approach for this disorder (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). Clinical 
outcome trials have established the behavioural treatment of exposure 
response prevention (ERP) as the treatment of choice for compulsions (e.g. 
Hand, 1998). Preliminary evidence is divided as to whether cognitive treatments 
are effective treatments in their own right (Dar, 1996, James and Blackburn, 
1995). Lindsey, Crino and Andrews (1997), demonstrate that the specificity of 
ERP to target particular symptoms is the vital element in treatment, compared 
to plausible general treatments such as anxiety management. The current study 
employed a single case successive treatments design to further investigate the 
extent to which treatment effects of ERP generalise to other non-treated 
compulsions. Results indicate that generalisation of ERP treatment gains does 
not occur, each compulsion requiring to be individually targeted and treated. 
This relationship was true for conceptually related and unrelated compulsions. 
Future research directions are discussed, along with clinical implications of the 
current findings.
Keywords: Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Behaviour Therapy,
Single Case Methodology
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Section 1. Appendices for Major Research Project Paper
1.1 Authors notes to the Journal of Abnormal Psychology
Instructions to Authors 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology
Most of the articles published in the Journal o f Abnormal 
Psychology are reports of original research, but other types of 
articles are acceptable. Short Reports of replications or of 
failures to replicate previously reported results are given seri­
ous consideration. Comments on articles published in the jour­
nal are also considered. Case studies from either a clinical 
setting or a laboratory will be considered if they raise or 
illustrate important questions that go beyond the single case 
and have heuristic value. Manuscripts that present or discuss 
theoretical formulations of psychopathology, or that evaluate 
competing theoretical formulations on the basis of published 
data, may also be accepted. For further information on content, 
authors may refer to the Journal Description.
Authors must prepare manuscripts according to the Publi­
cation Manual o f the American Psychological Association (4th 
ed.). All manuscripts must include an abstract that contains a 
maximum of 960 characters and spaces (which is about 120 
words) typed on a separate sheet of paper. All copy must be 
double-spaced, and further typing instructions, especially in 
regard to tables, figures, references, metrics, and abstracts, 
appear in the Manual. Also, all manuscripts are copyedited for 
bias-free language (see chap. 2 of the Publication Manual). 
Original color figures can be printed in color provided the 
author agrees to pay half of the associated production costs.
In preparing a Short Report, authors should set the 
character-space limit at 60 characters per line and should not 
exceed 410 lines of text and references (exclusive or the tide 
page, abstract, author note, footnotes, tables, and figures). 
There should be no more than two figures or tables. As for 
regular manuscripts, the abstract must not exceed 960 charac­
ters and spaces.
Masked reviews are optional, and authors who wish masked 
reviews must specifically request them when they submit their 
manuscripts. For masked reviews, each copy of the manuscript 
must include a separate tide page with the authors’ names and 
affilitadons, and these ought not to appear anywhere else in the 
manuscript Footnotes that identify the authors must be typed 
on a separate page. Authors are to make every effort to see that 
the manuscript itself contains no clues to their idenddes.
Articles, except where other limits are specified, must not be 
longer than 36 manuscript pages, unless they report an unusu­
ally large series of studies or present unusually important 
detail. Case studies are ordinarily no longer than 16 manuscript 
pages. Comments ought not to exceed half the length of the 
original article. For Short Reports, the length limits are exact 
and must be stricdy followed.
APA policy prohibits an author from submitting the same 
manuscript for concurrent consideration by two or more pub­
lications. In addition, it is a violation of APA Ethical Principles 
to publish “ as original data, data that have been previously 
published” (Standard 6.24). As this journal is a primary jour­
nal that publishes original material only, APA policy prohibits 
as well publication of any manuscript that has already been 
published in whole or substantial part elsewhere. Authors have 
an obligation to consult journal editors concerning prior pub­
lication of any data upon which their article depends. In addi­
tion, APA Ethical Principles specify that “after research re­
sults are published, psychologists do not withhold the data on 
which their conclusions are based from other competent pro­
fessionals who seek to verify the substantive claims through 
reanalysis and who intend to use such data only for that 
purpose, provided that the confidentiality of the participants 
can be protected and unless legal rights concerning proprietary 
data preclude their release” (Standard 6.25). APA expects 
authors submitting to this journal to adhere to these standards. 
Specifically, authors of manuscripts submitted to APA journals 
are expected to have available their data throughout the edito­
rial review process and for at least 5 years after the date of 
publication.
Authors will be required to state in writing that they have 
complied with APA ethical standards in the treatment of their 
sample, human or animal, or to describe the details of treat­
ment. A copy of the APA Ethical Principles may be obtained 
by writing the APA Ethics Office, 750 Fust Street, NE, Wash­
ington, DC 20002-4242.
Authors submit five (5) copies of their manuscripts. All 
copies must be clear, readable, and printed on paper of good 
quality. A dot matrix or unusual typeface is acceptable only if 
it is clear and legible. Dittoed or mimeographed copies are not 
acceptable and will not be considered. It is suggested that 
authors keep a copy of the manuscript to guard against loss. 
Manuscripts are not returned except on request.
In addition to postal addresses and telephone numbers, 
authors are requested to supply electronic mail addresses 
and fax numbers, if available, for use by the editorial and 
production offices. Effective in January 2000, the Incom­
ing Editor is receiving all submissions to the journal. 
Submissions that are accepted will be published begin­
ning in the 2001 volume. Mail manuscripts to the Incom­
ing Editor, Timothy B. Baker, Department of Psychol­
ogy, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1202 West 
Johnson Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.
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2.1 The Research Involvement of Psychologists Scale
THE RESEARCH 
INVOLVEMENT OF 
PSYCHOLOGISTS SCALE
This survey looks at clinical psychologist's involvement in a variety of research activities, their 
attitudes towards research and the nature of their working day. It is being distributed to all 
psychologists within Greater Glasgow Community and Mental Health Services NHS Trust and 
is entirely anonymous. Your time in completing it is highly valued.
Section A: Attitudes Towards Research
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.
1. In my post, I feel that research is
Strongly
Encouraged
Somewhat
Encouraged
Neither
Encouraged
nor
Discouraged
Somewhat
Discouraged
Strongly
Discouraged
2. How much is your clinical practice informed by research evidence ?
Strongly
Informed
Somewhat
Informed
Neither Informed Somewhat 
nor Uninformed
Uninformed
Strongly
Uninformed
1. I regularly think about areas of psychological theory / practice that I would like to 
research.
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor
Disagree
Disagree Strongly Disagree
4 I rarely get around to putting my research ideas into practice.
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor
Disagree
Disagree Strongly Disagree
5. Even if I had the time I don't feel I have the skills to carry out research.
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor
Disagree
Disagree Strongly Disagree
6. Pressure to spend time in clinical contact prevents me from doing research
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
nor
Disagree
7. Research is not the domain of clinical psychologists.
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
nor
Disagree
8. Clinical psychologists should have regular "agreed" time in which to pursue research.
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
nor
Disagree
9 .1 am not interested in doing research.
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
nor
Disagree
10. At the moment, my involvement in research is
Far too much Slightly too much About right Slightly too little Far too little
Section B: Research Activities
Please indicate your level of involvement in the following activities, using the scale below:
Involved in the 
last 12 months
Involved in the 
last 5 years
Involved since 
qualifying
Have never done 
this since 
qualifying
Clinical Outcome 
Studies
Service Related 
Research
Writing grant 
applications
Performing literature 
searches
Designing research 
studies, including 
questionnaire / 
survey design
Data collection and / 
or data entry
Data analysis
Writing up of 
results
Managing ongoing 
Research projects 
(Please indicate how 
many)
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Involved in the 
last 12 months
Involved in the 
last 5 years
Involved since 
qualifying
Have never done 
this since 
qualifying
Writing empirical 
papers.
Writing conceptual /
theoretical
papers
Submitting work for 
publication
Having work 
published
Presenting at local 
Events
(dept meetings, 
research forums, 
interest groups)
Presenting at national 
international 
conferences, 
meetings etc.
Attending
(but not presenting at) 
local events
Attending national / 
international events
Reading empirical 
articles / books
Discussing research 
articles / ideas with 
colleagues
Using single case 
Designs with 
measures
Using evidence 
based treatments
Seeing patients as 
part of a research 
study
Training others as 
part of a research 
study
Supervising other 
people's research 
( Assistants, 
Trainees, Other 
Disciplines)
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Involved in the 
last 12 months
Involved in the 
last 5 years
Involved since 
qualifying
Have never done 
this since 
qualifying
Meta-analytical
studies
Writing Review 
Articles
Other research 
(please specify)
a.)
b.)
c.)
d.)
Section C: About Your Career
In compiling the following questions care has been taken to ensure that individual 
psychologists can not be identified from their responses.
1. Please indicate the number of years you have been qualified
2. What type of post do you hold ? 100 % Clinical □  Split Clinical / Academic □
3. Are you currently in receipt of any research grants / other funding ? YES □  NO □
4. What Grade are you ? A Grade □  B Grade □
5. Please indicate the type of qualification^) you hold:
D. Clin. Psy □  Ph.D. □  Masters □
6. Are you currently registered for a further degree ? NO □  YES □  Please specify___
7. On average I spend____________hours per week involved in management duties.
8. On average I spend____________hours per week in clinical supervision of other staff.
9. On average I offer_____________hours of clinical contact per week.
10. On average I spend____________hours per week involved in research.
11 I would describe my favoured theoretical orientation as:
Cognitive -  Cognitive Behavioural Psycho- Eclectic Other
Behavioural dynamic ( specify)
100
If you have opinions about research that you have not been able to express through our 
questions, please use this space to inform us.
Your time taken in filling in this questionnaire is greatly appreciated, please return it to David 
Gillanders or Susan Howat, using the internal mail envelope and address label provided.
Thank You
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2.2 Authors notes for The Journal of Clinical Effectiveness
INSTRUCTION TO AUTHORS
Jo u r n a l  of Clin ic a l  Effectiveness
Original articles should be submitted to:
Ms M ary Edwards
Northampshire Hospitals NHS Trust,
Aldermaston Road,
Basringstoke,
Hampshire RG24 9NA, UK.
Enquiries to editorial office on: +44 (0) 171 274 3476
The editors cannot accept responsibility for damage or loss of 
typescripts.
A paper is accepted for publication on the understanding it 
has not been submitted simultaneously to another journal in 
the English language.
Rejected papers will not be returned to authors except on 
request.
All submissions will be peer reviewed. The Editors reserve the 
right to make editorial and literary corrections.
Any opinions expressed or policies advocated do not neces­
sarily reflect the opinion or policy of the Editors.
COPYRIGHT
The copyright of the journal is held by Financial Times 
Professional Ltd and the copyright on each paper must be 
assigned to Financial Times Professional Ltd by the Senior 
author (on behalf of all the authors). Extra copies of the copy­
right form are available from the publishers or the Editors.
We assure you that no limitation will be put on your personal 
freedom to use material contained in the paper, provided 
acknowledgement is made to the journal as the original source 
of publication.
CHECKLIST
Before sending your typescript ensure that you have included 
the follow ing:
•  Three good-quality typescripts, double line spaced
•  Figures o f  reproducib le  quality (n o t photocopies)
•  A com plete reference list w ith  no missing details and cited in 
the text
•  W ritten  permission fro m  the orig ina l publishers and authors 
to  reproduce any borrowed material.
DISK SUBMISSION
Once a paper has been accepted fo r publication, submission 
on disk w ill be requested. The hard paper copy must match the 
e lectronic version exactly. Please label your disk clearly.
PRESENTATION OF TYPESCRIPTS
•  Please include the fu ll title  o f your paper plus your preferred 
title  and professional name and address fo r correspondence, 
i f  d iffe ren t.
•  Copy must be typed double-spaced throughout.
•  Include headings to  facilitate reading and understanding, 
d istinguishing m ajor and m ino r headings.
•  Illustrations can be included to  clarify’ your material. Please 
send on ly  good quality reproducible figures, inc lud ing cap­
tions fo r each one. Make sure the figure is cited in  the text.
•  Tables should be double-spaced on separate sheets. Make 
sure that the table is cited in  the text.
Full papers
Papers should be set ou t as follows w ith each section beginning 
on a separate sheet: title  page, summary text, acknowledge­
ments, references, tables, captions to illustrations. They should
be between 2,000 and 4,000 words. A u d it projects o f  500-1000 
words are also acceptable fo r publication.
Title page
The title  page should give the fo llow ing  in fo rm ation :
*  title  o f  artic le
*  in itia ls  and name o f each au tho r
•  name and address o f the departm ent o r ins titu tion  to which 
the w ork should be a ttributed
*  telephone and fax contact numbers.
Summary
Th is should consist o f  no t m ore than 150 words summarizing 
the contents o f  the article.
Text
Headings should be appropriate to  the nature o f  the paper, 
the use o f  headings enhances readability.
Do no t use ‘he*, ‘his’ etc. where the sex o f  the person is unknown: 
say ‘ the patient* etc. Avoid inelegant alternatives such as ‘he/she*. 
References
The accuracy o f  references is the responsibility o f  the author. 
References should be entered consecutively by Arabic super­
script numerals in  the text. T he  reference lis t should be listed 
in  num erica l o rde r on a separate sheet in  double spacing. 
References to  jou rna ls  should include the au tho r’s name and 
in itia ls  (lis t a ll authors when six o r fewer, when seven o r more, 
lis t on ly  the firs t six and add ‘e t al*), fu ll title  o f  paper, jo u rn a l 
title  (do no t use abbreviations o f  jo u rn a l titles), year o f  pub li­
cation, volum e number, first and last page numbers.
For example:
Small J O . Management alternatives. Journa l o f  H ealth  Services 
Research and Policy 1995; 1(1): 22-25 
References to  books should be set ou t as follows:
McKinney P, C onn B. Management Ethics. Edinburgh: 
C hurch ill Livingstone, 1995
Statistics
N um erical data should be analysed by appropriate statistical 
methods.
The use o f  standard deviation and standard e rro r should be 
clearly distinguished. Use o f  ‘±* symbol should be avoided: 
these statistics should be presented in  parentheses after the 
mean value.
Tables
These should be double spaced on separate sheets and contain 
on ly horizonta l rules. A short descriptive title  should appear 
above each table and any footnotes suitably iden tified . Ensure 
that each table is cited in the text.
Line illustrations
A ll line illustra tions should present a crisp black image on an 
even white background (no smaller than 127 x  173 mm and no 
larger than 203 X 254 mm).
PERMISSIONS TO PRODUCE BORROWED MATERIAL
W ritten permissions to reproduce borrowed material (illustra­
tions, tables, etc.) must be obtained from  the o rig ina l publish­
ers and authors, and submitted w ith the typescript. Borrowed 
material should be acknowledged in the captions.
PROOFS
•  Page proofs are sent to the first-named o r corresponding 
au thor fo r checking. The proofs plus any m ino r corrections 
should be re turned to the Production E ditor by fax o r post 
w ith in  48 hours o f  rece ip t
•  O ffp rin ts  may be ordered on a fo rm  which w ill accompany 
your page proofs. The m in im um  order is fo r 100 and a 
charge w ill be made.
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Instructions to Authors
Submission
Articles written in  English and no t submitted fo r publication elsewhere should be sent to:
Paul Salkovskis 
Editor
Bebaviotsral ond Cognitive Psychotherapy 
Department o f  Psychiatry 
University o f  O xford 
W ameford Hospital 
O xford 0 X 3  7JX 
U K
M anuscrip t preparation
Four complete copies o f  the manuscript must be submitted. Original figures should be supplied at the time o f  submission. Articles must 
be typed double-spaced throughout on standard sized paper (preferably A4) allowing wide margins all round. Where unpublished material, 
e.g. behaviour rating scales, therapy manuals etc., is referred to in an article, copies should be submitted to facilitate review.
Manuscripts w ill be sent out fo r review exacdy as submitted. Authors who want a blind review should mark three copies o f  their article 
‘review copy*, om itting from  these copies details o f  authorship and other identifying information. Submission fo r blind review is encouraged.
Abbreviations where used must be standard. The Systcme International (SI) should be used for all units; where metric units are used the 
SI equivalent must also be given. Probability values and power statistics should be given w ith statistical values and degrees o f  freedom (e.g. 
F (l,3 4 )“  123 .07 ./< .001 ), but such information may be included in  tables rather than the main text. SpelBng must be consistent w ith in an 
article, either using British usage (Tbe Shorter Oxford English dictionary, o r American usage (Webster's new collegiate dictionary). However, spelling 
in the list o f  references must be literal to each original publication.
Details o f  style not specified here may be determined by reference to  the Publications manual o f tbe American Psychological Association o r the 
style manual o f  the British Psychological Society.
Articles should conform  to the following scheme
(a) Title page. The article should phrase concisely the major issues. Authors) to  be given w ith departmental affiliations and addresses, 
grouped appropriately. A  running head o f  no more than 40 characters should be indicated.
(b) Abstract. The abstract should include up to six key words that could be used to describe the article. This should summarize the article 
in no more than 200 words.
(c) Toct. This should begin w ith an introduction, succincdy introducing the point o f  the paper to  those interested in the general area o f 
the journal. Attention sbonld be paid to tbe Editorial Statement which appears in tbe January and July issues at tbe back o f tbe Journal References 
w ithin the text should be given in die form Jones and Smith (1973) o r (Jones 6c Smith, 1973). When there are three o r up to and 
including five authors the first citation should include all authors; subsequent citations should be given as Williams et al. (1973). Authors 
w ith the same surname should be distinguished by their initials. The approximate positions o f  tables and figures should be indicated in 
the text. Footnotes should be avoided where possible.
(d) Reference notdj). A  list o f  all cited unpublished o r limited circulation material, numbered in order o f  appearance in the text, giving as 
much information as possible about extant manuscripts.
(c) References. A ll citations in the text should be listed in strict alphabetical order according to surnames. Multiple references to the same 
authors) should be listed chronologically, using a, b, etc., fo r entries w ithin the same year. Formats fo r journal articles, books and 
chapters should fo llow  these examples:
BECKER, M . R., 6c  G r e e n ,  L. W. (1975). A  family approach to  compliance w ith medical treatment: A  selective review o f the 
literature. International Journal of Health Education, 18, 173—182.
T h a r p ,  R. G., 6c  W e t z e l ,  R. J. (1969). Behaviour modification in tbe natural environment, New York: Academic Press.
R o s k ie s ,  E., 6c L a z a r u s ,  R. S. (1980). Coping theory and the teaching o f  coping skills. In P. O. Davidson 6c S. M. Davidson 
(Eds.), Behavioural medicine: Changing health lifestyles. New York: Brunncr/Mazel.
(f) Footnotes. The first, and preferably only, footnote w ill appear at the foot o f  the first page o f  each article, and subsequently may acknowledge 
previous unpublished presentation (e.g. dissertation, meeting paper), financial support, scholarly or technical assistance, o r a change in 
affiliation. A  concluding (or only) paragraph must be the name and fu ll mailing address o f  the author to whom reprint requests o r other 
enquiries should be sent
(g) Tables. Tables should be numbered and given explanatory titles.
(h) Figure options. Numbered captions should be typed on a separate page.
(i) Figures. Original drawings o r prints must be submitted for each line or half-tone illustration. Figures should be clearly labelled and be 
camera-ready wherever possible.
Proofs, Reprints and C opyrigh t
On acceptance a 3.5 soft copy w ill be requested. Proofs o f  accepted articles w ill be sent to authors for the correction o f  printers’ errors; 
authors’ alterations may be charged. Authors submitting a manuscript do so on the understanding that i f  i t  is accepted for publication 
exclusive copyright o f  the paper shall be assigned to the Association. In  consideration o f  the assignment o f  copyright, 25 copies o f  each 
paper w ill be supplied. Further reprints may be ordered at extra cost: the reprint order form w ill be sent w ith the proofs. The publishers 
w ill not put any lim itation on the personal freedom o f the author to use material contained in the paper in other works.
Typeset and Printed in the United Kingdom b y j.  W. Arrowsmith Ltd., Bristol.
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Section 4: Appendices for Major Research Project Proposal
4.1 Word lists to be used in the Modified Paired Associate Learning Task
Real Words
Positive Neutral Negative
Helpful Hesitant Hostile
Kind Average Rude
Taken from:
Anderson, N. H. (1968). Likeableness ratings of 555 Personality Trait Words. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9, 272-279.
Non-Word Trigrams
MEZ SEP VOY
BIS JEK FOS
Taken from
Montague, W. E., & Keiss, H. O. (1967). The associability of CVC pairs. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, Supplementary Monograph, Vol. 78,2, Part 2.
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4.2 Information sheet and consent form used to recruit participants 
f —  —  ----------------------------------
GREATER GLASGOW PRIMARY CARE NHS TRUST
PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET 
“An Experimental Study of Repetitive Thinking In Depression”
11th October 1999 
Dear Sir / Madam,
I have asked the person you have been seeing to give you this form because part of the problem 
you are being seen for is depression.
I am writing to ask that you consider being a participant in a research study investigating the 
way in which depression affects how people think.
Psychologists have known for some time that people who have depression are often self-critical 
or expect negative things to happen.
It has been suggested by recent research carried out by psychologists elsewhere in the U.K. that 
one of the reasons that people find it very hard to break out of depressed moods is that these 
negative thoughts are very likely to persist in a repetitive way.
The study that I propose attempts to understand this better, so that in future, psychological 
treatments may be developed which help to reduce the repetitive thinking and thereby provide 
better psychological therapy for depression.
Your involvement in this study would make no difference to your own treatment, but will 
hopefully lead to greater understanding of depression. Clearer understanding of the way in 
which the mind works in depression could be vital to finding faster and better psychological 
treatments for future sufferers of this disabling condition.
If you were to agree to be involved in this research, you would be contacted either by post or 
telephone, according to your wishes, and offered an appointment at your convenience. You 
would be asked to complete three short paper and pencil questionnaires asking about your 
moods, personality and other information such as your age, gender and whether you take any 
medication etc.
The total time for the study is expected to be approximately one hour.
You will not be asked to talk about yourself or have to think about or provide any personal 
information.
First, you will be asked a series of questions about your moods and other symptoms you may 
have experienced. Secondly, you will be asked to rate how well certain words describe you. 
Next, you will be asked to read out-loud a list of words. Then you will be read a list of different 
words that have been paired together with three letter non-words, like this:
Naive - DAP 
Choosy - NAZ
After each set of 6 words, you will be given the first parts and asked which non words went with 
them. These sequences will be repeated several times to give you a chance to leam them. After a
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certain number of attempts, the words will be mixed up and you will be asked to try to leam the 
new pairs.
There is no right or wrong answer; I am interested in how depression affects thinking.
The appointment should not be distressing and will take only one hour, at a time that is 
convenient to you. Your participation will be completely confidential. The only record that will 
be kept of your name is the attached consent form. This consent form will be kept completely 
confidential. The person you have been seeing is not involved in this study and will not know 
whether you decide to take part or decide not to take part. Regardless of your decision, your 
treatment will not be affected in any way.
I will be running the experiment myself, I am a trainee clinical psychologist with experience of 
interviewing and treating people who have depression. If you need more information before 
deciding whether or not to take part, I can be contacted by telephone on 0141 / 211 3920. I am 
happy to discuss the study with you, after which you are under no obligation to take part.
If you agree to be contacted for this research, please fill in and sign the consent form. The 
consent form also asks that an independent witness signs. This is to ensure that people 
participating in research do so of their own free will. The witness can be your choice of any one 
not involved in the study.
Please use the FREEPOST envelope provided to return the consent form.
YOU DO NOT NEED TO PUT A STAMP ON THE ENVELOPE.
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet,
Yours faithfully,
DAVID GILLANDERS 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
106
GREATER GLASGOW PRIMARY CARE NHS TRUST
PATIENT CONSENT FORM 
“An Experimental Study of Repetitive Thinking In Depression”
Name: _______________________________
Address:_____ _______________________________
Telephone:___ _______________________________
(  i f  you would rather not be contacted by telephone, leave the space blank and you will be 
contacted by post instead)
Male: □ Female: □ (please tick a box)
I ..................................................... declare that I have read and understood the attached
information sheet. I have kept a copy of the information sheet for myself.
I have had an opportunity to discuss and ask questions about the study with the research worker.
I am fully aware that it is my right to end my participation in the study at any time I choose and 
I do not need to give a reason for doing so.
I understand that my treatment will not be affected in any way, whatever I  have chosen now or 
at any future time, and that my participation is completely confidential.
I therefore consent to take part in the study as described.
Signed Date
Witness..................................................Date
